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This comparative study sought to answer the following key research question: to what 
extent are current and proposed biosafety legislations in Kenya and South Africa 
consistent with or at variance with key provisions of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
(the Protocol)? The specific objectives of the study were: to provide an overview of 
international and African regional approaches to regulation of modern biotechnology; to 
establish the extent to which such legislation is consistent with or at variance with key 
provisions of the Protocol, and to assess whether the above legislations are relevant and 
workable domestically. The study utilized the comparative study methodology. Analysis 
was guided by a conceptual framework which captured variance and consistency of the 
Kenyan Biosafety Bill 2005 on one hand and the Genetically Modified Organisms Act 
1
together with the Genetically Modified Organisms Amendment Bill 2005 on the other 
hand as against the Protocol. 
 
The study noted that whereas Legal regulation of modern biotechnology is a complex and 
a sensitive issue globally, translating science into the normative language of law is itself a 
complex process. The intricacies of legal regulation are exacerbated by the competing 
and quite often, irreconcilable socio-economic, cultural, ethical and political imperatives 
that affect biosafety legislation. Biosafety legislation in Africa is at its infancy yet 
attempts to establish and maintain a balance; grapples with the above competing 
imperatives thereby raising political questions that leave African states (Kenya and South 
Africa included) caught up in the genetically modified organisms (GMOs) cold war. In 
essence, modern biotechnology raises and leaves more questions than can be answered. 
 
The findings of this thesis are threefold: the Protocol is itself inadequate; variance 
significantly outweighs consistency in attempts to comply with the Protocol by Kenya 
and South Africa, and establishing relevant and workable biosafety legislations in the two 
countries is problematic and unforeseeable in the near future if not mired in controversy. 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
 
‘This we know: the earth does not belong to man: Man belongs to the earth…All things are connected like 
the blood which unites one family…Whatever befalls the earth, befalls the son of the earth. Man does not 







Legal regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) is a complex and sensitive 
issue globally. One of the main reasons of the complexity is because translating science 
into policy and ultimately law is itself, a complex process.
3
 Moreover legal regulation of 
modern biotechnology creates even greater challenges as it grapples with contradictory 
and invariably competing and often, irreconcilable interests. As Bauer and Gaskell argue, 
biotechnology inherently operates within and alongside an interplay of economic, legal, 
religious, mass media and political environment,
4
 each of which has vested interests. It is 
for these reasons that as Kidd authoritatively states, “environmental issues are prominent 
in people’s minds and they dominate political agendas”
5
 worldwide since, as Glazweski 




Whereas some fear that without stringent legislation, genetic engineering and GMOs will 
lead to a fundamental threat to human health and the balance of ecosystems, others see 
                                                 
2
  Letter from Chief Seattle, Patriach of the Duwamish and Squamish Indians of Puget Sound, 
    to the President of the United States, Franklin Pierce in 1955 quoted in Environmental pollution  
    control by J.McLoughlin and E.G. Bellinger. - 1993. pg.157. 
3
  Mazzoni C,(Ed.) Ethics and Law in Biological Research, 2002, Martinus NIJHOFF Publishers,  
    The Hague / London / New York, Pg 81. Also my personal interview with MrElpidio Peria of 





November 2006 in which he was a delegate. The interviewee represents Philippines in CBD meetings. He 
confirmed that that even agreeing on definitions of scientific terminologies in such meetings is problematic. 
As a result many definitions remain in quotation marks. His Contact is with the writer 
4
  Bauer M and Gaskell G, Biotechnology: The Making of a Global Controversy, Cambridge University 
   Press, London, 2002, Pg.4 
5
 Kidd Michael, Environmental Law in South Africa, , Juta &Co Ltd, 1997.Pg.1. 
6
  Glazweski J, Environmental Law in South Africa, 2
nd




any limitation as a hindrance to human development and sound science.
7
 Although it has 
been argued that everything depends on what is considered acceptable,
8
 attempts to 
establish and maintain a balance on what is acceptable among the competing interests, 
creates legal challenges and political paradigms that are difficult to reconcile when 
promulgating biosafety legislation. Moreover, the rules which make up environmental 
law are a consequence of the establishment of political aims and goals and the setting of 




Efforts to balance the above and other interests in the making of biosafety legislation are 
further complicated and hardly objective for two reasons. Whereas scientists have vested 
interests in the scientific inventions associated with genetic engineering, they are often at 
the center of decision making. Other complications arise due to the fact that science does 
not have all the answers relating to the risks associated with modern 
biotechnology.
10
.This has led to increased skepticism about the role of science in 
resolving regulatory controversies.
11
  Consequently, modern biotechnology raises and 
leaves more questions than can be answered as is evident from this comparative study of 
current and proposed biosafety legislation in Kenya and South Africa. 
 
1.1.2 Biotechnology 
Biotechnology is not a new phenomenon in human history. It is defined as any 
technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives 
thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific use.
12
 Essentially it implies 
the use of microbial, animal or plant cells or enzymes to synthesize, breakdown or 
transform materials.
13
 Biotechnology has been practiced for centuries in baking bread, 
                                                 
7
  Perrez F , ‘GMOs and International Law: The Swiss Example’, RECEIL 14 (2) 2005, 161. 
8
 Bell S and McGillivray D, Environmental Law, Sixth Ed., Oxford University Press, 2006, Pg.14. 
9
  Bell S and McGillivray D, supra, Pg. 48. 
10
  Kinderlerer J, Regulation of Biotechnology: Needs and Burdens for developing countries, Available at  
     www.google.com 
11
  Sands P, Nelkin D and Stewart R, ‘The international Challenge of GMO Regulation’  
    8 N.Y.U.Envtl L.J 524, 1999 – 2000. 
12
  Article. 2 of the Convention. 
13
  Smith E, Biotechnology, 4
th




beer, wine and compost.
14
 These traditional practices of biotechnology do not appear to 
have caused any serious problems. It is modern biotechnology that is problematic and 
controversial as indicated below. 
 
1.1.3 Modern Biotechnology 
Modern biotechnology was the result of the discovery of the structure of Recombinant 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) by two scientists Watson and Crick in the 1950s.
15
  Genetic 
modification also referred to as ‘genetic engineering’, (which developed since the 1970s), 
with the associated recombinant DNA technology is the new powerful tool for 
biotechnology.
16
 Modern biotechnology is defined as application of in vitro nuclei acid 
techniques, including DNA and direct injection of nucleic acid into cells or organs or 
organelles, or fusion of cells beyond the taxonomic family, that overcome natural 
physiological reproductive or combination barriers and that are not techniques used in 




Through genetic modification genes are transferred and modified between different 
species, and between animals and plants and micro-organisms.
18
 Smith asserts that in 
essence, gene technology is the modification of the genetic properties of an organism by 
the use of recombinant DNA technology.
19
 Consequently, genetic engineering has given 
mankind the ability to create novel plants, animals and micro-organisms with properties 
they could never have acquired naturally and new organisms can now be created not in 
accordance with the natural laws of survival but in accordance with human will
20
 thereby 
raising unresolved ethical moral and other issues. 
 
                                                 
14
  Mackenzie, Ruth, Burhehenne-Guilmin  and Others (Eds) An Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena  
     Protocol on Biosafety, IUCN, Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, 2003, Pg. 25. (hereinafter 
    Mackenzie and others ,Explanatory Guide) 
15
  Mackenzie and others(Eds), supra, Explanatory Guide, supra, Pg. 6. 
16
  Walgate R, Miracle or Menace?: Biotechnology for the third world, , Palmos institute 1990, Pg. 3. 
17
  Article .3 Protocol. 
18
  Mackenzie and others(Eds), supra,  (Explanatory Guide) , supra, Par. 28 
19
  Smith E, supra, pp. 42. 
20




1.1.3.1   Benefits and Potential risks  
Genetically Modified Organisms are said to have benefits yet they are potentially harmful 
to the environment and humans. It is argued that modern biotechnology can be used to 
slow environmental degradation due to a decrease in the need for pesticides and 
herbicides; and weeds.
21
 The increase in yields may reduce agricultural clearing and 
thereby reduce habitat loss and damage to biodiversity.
22
 It has been observed that these 
genetically modified (GM) crops engineered to be resistant to insects, disease, parasites, 
drought and soil depletion, promise similar benefits for developing countries.
23
 Such a 
promise at times turns into disappointment as in the state of Andhra Pradesh in India 
where Monsanto Bt cotton has failed and approval withdrawn.
24
 It is however argued that 
these apparent benefits are used as an excuse to protect the commercial and trade interests 
of the GMO promoters, as what is important depends on the value and priority one gives 
to it. 
 
There are significant potential environmental risks associated with modern 
biotechnology. A few examples will suffice. A genetically modified crop may transfer 
modified genes to wild relatives and potentially create a “super weed” or could itself 
become a weed potentially threatening biodiversity. It is further argued that the spread of 
GM traits can threaten valuable wild precursors of crop plants and invade neighbouring 
organic and other non-genetically modified crops.
25
 In Hoffman v Monsanto,
26
 the 
plaintiffs claimed damages caused to them by the defendants’ genetically modified (GM) 
canola on the grounds that the ‘adventitious presence’ of GM canola in fields of organic 
grain farmers, ‘made it impossible’, for farmers to guarantee that canola grown as organic 
did not contain traces of GM canola seed. Justice Smith dismissed the plaintiff’s suit, for 
failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action under the common law rules on 
                                                 
21
   Schneir D , supra,  at 386 
22
  Adler J H, Cartagena Protocol: Biosafety or Bio-sorry?- 12 Georgetown Int’l Envt’l L.J Rev. 2000,  
     761 at 772. 
23
   Meijer E, and Stewart R, ‘The GM Cold War: How Developing Countries Can go from being Deminos  
      to being Players’ REICEL 13(3) 2004, 250. 
24
   ‘Whither Biosafety?’, Grain October 2005 Available at www.grain.org/articles_files/biosafety 
   Last visited on 8
th
 Jan. 2007. 
25
  Meijer E and Stewart R, supra, 250. 
26




negligence in accordance with Rylands v Fletcher,
27
 strict liability and trespass.
28
 





The potential risks to human health include allergy and, reduction in the expected levels 
of nutrients, decreased efficacy of antibiotics, speedier development of antibiotic resistant 
bacteria and greater human exposure to herbicides.
30
 The potential risks have made legal 
regulation of modern biotechnology imperative. 
 
1.1.3.2   International Regulation 
International regulation of modern biotechnology (discussed in chapter two) mainly 
began with the adoption of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD, see 2.2) in 
1992. The Convention has two important provisions that directly relate to this study. It 
requires that “each party shall… [D]evelop national strategies, plans or programmes for 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity…”
31
 Glowka observes that 
strategies, plans or programmes are the mechanisms through which a party can “organize 
and implement” its approach to biodiversity conservation and the sustainable use of its 
components. He takes the view that the process of developing them is “as important as 
their implementation” and that “successful implementation may very much depend on the 
process leading to their development”.
32
 In essence efforts at international regulation of 
modern biotechnology were necessitated by the need to protect biodiversity from the 
potential harmful effects of GMOs. Second Article 19(3) of the Convention makes 
provision urging parties to consider the need for a biosafety Protocol (see 2.2) hence the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (the Protocol). 
 
                                                 
27
  (1868) L.R 1 Ex.265; L.R. 3 H.L 330. 
28
  Ibid Pars. 19, 88-95;341. 
29
  Sunday Times,  South Africa, 9
th
 July 2006.  
30
  Mackenzie and others (Eds), (Explanatory Guide) Pg. 8 
31
  Article 6(a) CBD. 
32
  Glowka, L, et al, 1994, A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, IUCN, Gland Cambridge, 




Currently global regulation is essentially through the Protocol
33
 (see 2.3). Efforts at 
adoption of the Protocol, in the late twentieth and the beginning of the twenty first 
century were resisted and delayed and even negotiations stalled.
34
 This resulted in the 
adoption of a compromise treaty in respect to living modified organisms (LMOs) 
35
as 
opposed to genetically modified organisms (GMOs),
36
 which embrace both living and 
dead organisms. In effect, the Protocol is selective and limited in its application to 
GMOs. This is why the Protocol lacks a holistic approach biosafety regulation.  
 
Inadequate as it maybe, member states are obligated to take necessary and appropriate 
legal and administrative and other measures to implement their obligations under the 
Protocol.
37
 The Protocol has significant influence over domestic biosafety and it is 
regarded as a ‘cornerstone’
38
 which attempts to set forth the scientific and legal 
boundaries for national biosafety regulatory systems and establish a minimum set of rules 
and procedures.
39
  However, in exercise of their sovereign rights, both in international 
law and under the Protocol 
40
 states have a right to adopt more stringent biosafety 
legislation that fits into their own local circumstances if they have the political will to 
enable them do so. 
 
1.1.3.3   The African Regional approach 
The gaps and inadequacies inherent in the Protocol necessitated the African Union to 
adopt the African model law in 2001 (discussed in chapter two).Although the African 
Model law is holistic in its approach and provides for more stringent rules, it has no 
binding force. Its influence and effect in domestic implementation are yet to be realized. 
 
                                                 
33
  Signed in Montreal on 29
th
 Jan. 2000 and entered into force on the 11
th
 Sept. 2003. 
34
  Pomerance R, , ‘The Biosafety Protocol: Cartagena and Beyond, 8 N.Y.Envtal L.J 1999-2000 
     pp. 614-616 
35
  Article. 1 Protocol. 
36
  See the Preamble to the African Model Law for a definition and Art. 2 for the Scope thereof. 
37
  Article .2 Protocol. 
38
  Burgei S, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Taking the steps from Negotiation to Implementation. 
    Reicel 11(1) 2002, pp.53  
39
  Jaffe G, ‘Implementing the Cartagena biosafety Protocol through National Biosafety Regulaatory 
    Systems: An Analysis of Key Unresolved Issues’ J.Publ.Aff. 5: 2005, Pg. 299. 
40




Biosafety legislation in Africa is problematic and slow and at its infancy. Yong asserts 
that issues of biosafety were (and probably are) “completely new” for many countries 
especially among the developing countries.
41
 In such circumstances attempts to regulate 
Biosafety have been resisted and slow; expensive 
42
and invariably cumbersome. At the 
same time such attempts must grapple with the powerful forces (discussed in chapter 
two) that influenced the provisions of the Protocol Moreover, Africa has become a target 
of a GM lobby desperate to open new markets and enhance its public relations with the 




Walgate identifies two added complications unique to Africa. Technology is in the hands 
of strong multinational companies (such as Monsanto) supported by their governments 
‘whose motives may be suspected’. Two, lax or non-existent regulations controlling 
biotechnology releases in the third world attract the multinational companies to test 





1.1.3.4   Domestic Implementation 
Member states are under an obligation to comply with their obligations under the 
Protocol.
45
 One such obligation is to develop regulatory frameworks that are consistent 
with the Protocol.
46
 Kenya and South Africa being member states and the leading 
promoters of GMOs in Africa
47
 have every reason to have biosafety laws in place and in 
the process or as a consequence, attempt to comply with the Protocol. 
 
                                                 
41
  Yong P, From Adoption tio Implementation of the Cartagena Protocol: A Review of the Progress Made 
      by the ICCP in Preparing for the first meeting of the COP-MOP pp.38 Available at www.biodiv.org 
42
  Kinderlerer J, Regulation of Biotechnology: Needs and Burdens for developing countries, supra, 
Available at  www.unep.ch/biosafety/development/developments/BTregulationpdf las accessed on  
    15
th
 Dec. 2006. 
43
  ‘Whither Biosafety?’ An opinion Paper Published by GRAIN, Oct 2005  available at 
      www.grain.org./atg/ last visited on 8
th
 Jan. 2007.  
44
  Walgate R, supra pp. 172 
45
  Article. 2(10 Protocol 
46
  Article. 9(3) Protocol 
47
  Traynor P and Macharia H, ‘An Analysis of the biosafety System for biotechnology in Kenya: An 





Falkner and Gupta state that the regulatory process of GMOs in South Africa dates back 
to the late 1980s when there was no biosafety law in place. At that time research and field 
testing of transgenics was regulated under the 1983 Agricultural pests Act and a South 
Africa Committee for genetic experimentation (SAGENE) served as the scientific 
advisory body on environmental releases of GMOs. The first general release of 
transgenics occurred in 1997. Subsequently the GMO Act was passed in 1997 and 
became operational in 1999. The GMO is Act administered by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and it establishes procedures and an institutional structure for regulating 
transgenics in South Africa. Currently South Africa is the only country in Africa that 




The first pilot biosafety project in Kenya started in 1997 after approval by the Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF) Council. In 1998 the National Council of Science and 
Technology (NCST) produced the first regulations and guidelines which to date govern 
GMO activities in the country. Kenya was the first country to sign the Protocol in May 
2000. Development of biosafety legislation is in part a UNE/GEF project. Absence of a 
biosafety Act has made it difficult for transgenics to be released for commercial use. 
 
In an attempt to comply with the Protocol in their domestic legislation, Kenya which has 
no biosafety Act, drafted the Biosafety Bill 2003 which never saw the light of the day. 
The same has now been replaced by Biosafety Bill 2005 that is yet to be presented to 
parliament while South Africa has opted to amend the current GMO Act
49
 by filling gaps 
through the GMO Amendment Bill 2005 (pending before parliament). Biosafety 
legislation in South Africa and Kenya, present test cases of the challenges facing many 
African countries in attempts to develop biosafety legislation. Whereas the member states 
are under an obligation to comply with the provisions of the Protocol in their domestic 
legislation, these attempts cannot in themselves be tenable. It is imperative that such 
                                                 
48
  Falkner R and Gupta A, ‘The Cartagena Protocol on biosafety and Domestic Implementation: 
Comparing Mexico, China and South Africa’, March 2006, ChathamHouse, Available at 
www.chathamhouse.org.uk/eedp last accessed on 6th Dec. 2006. 
49




biosafety legislation is ultimately holistic, relevant and workable, if it is to serve any 
meaningful purpose.  
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
The problems and dilemmas arising from genetic engineering are a reflection of a wider
50
 





 have vested commercial and political interests in GMOs. 
In Kenya for instance, the US and some European countries have vested interests in the 
proposed biosafety law and regulations. It has been claimed that they are trying to 





Legal regulation of modern biotechnology must therefore contend with several critical 
concerns (discussed in 1.3 below) in an attempt to establish and maintain a balance 
between exploiting and safeguarding the benefits accruing from scientific inventions in 
modern biotechnology on one hand, and the need to protect the environment and humans 
from the potential harmful effects of genetic engineering on the other hand. Attempts 
made to reconcile the competing paradigms and strike a balance have not been possible. 
Currently, only limited compromises have been achieved in international regulation of 
modern biotechnology by way of adoption and entry into force of the Cartagena Protocol 
on biosafety (see 2.3.1).  
 
The approach taken by the Protocol hardly serves the interests of the developing 
countries particularly in Africa. The Protocol is a compromise treaty which lays 
minimum requirements yet Africa’s rich biodiversity (worldwide), needs stringent rules 
                                                 
50
 The GMO debate relates to several other emotive and  conflicting   issues including globalization and  
global trade that fall outside the scope of this study.  
51
 Led by the US (which has refused to ratify the CBD) and Canada. The powerful nations push for GM  
   cropsand their governments acquiescence. See ‘USAID: making the world hungry for GM crops’ 
available at www.grain.org/seedling last visited on the 15
th
 Jan. 2007. 
52
 Led by Monsanto, Syngenta, Bayer, Dow and Dupont 
53
  Arthur O, ‘Kenya Intrigues Behind the Biosafety Bill’ 5
th
 May, 2006 Available 





that enhance its protection. Moreover African countries are ‘dumping grounds’
54
 of 
products which have been rejected in Europe or which cannot be tested in their home 
countries that have more stringent biosafety legislations. This explains why developing 
countries need more stringent biosafety legislations that fit into and serve their local 
circumstances  
 
Biosafety legislation in Kenya and South Africa presents test cases of the challenges 
facing many African countries. Apart from the obligation to implement the Protocol,
55
 it 
is imperative, ultimately, that each of the two countries adopts biosafety legislation that is 
holistic, relevant and workable, if such legislation is to serve any meaningful purpose 
domestically.  
 
In essence, this study compares existing and proposed domestic biosafety law in Kenya 
and South Africa with a view to examine how the respective jurisdictions have grappled 
(and are grappling) to incorporate the complex issues alluded to above in their existing 
and proposed domestic law and also to consider the extent to which the resultant 
legislation is relevant and workable. This arguably constitutes the litmus test and 
provides a basis for future development of biosafety legislation in Africa as a whole. 
While this is desirable, several biosafety concerns have caused complications. We now 
examine some of these concerns. 
 
1.3 Key Biosafety Concerns 
Modern biotechnology raises several and intricate biosafety concerns. In this section, we 
examine four main ones: opposing approaches to issues of biosafety, issues of risk 
assessment, the changing character of biosafety concerns and ethical issues.  
 
First as Magnognile and Zacher observe: the point at issue in relation to environmental 
protection is ‘how much and how’?
56
 The extent and manner in which international 
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regulation of biosafety should be permissible have divided the international community 
to two main competing and opposing camps. Sheldon succinctly states the problem as 
follows: 
there are clearly very distinct differences between the US and EU approaches 
to regulation of GMOs. The US approach is based on a scientific, risk-based 
assessment of GMOs, and the principles of substantial equivalence and 
minimal oversight of food products that are GRAS. The logical conclusion 
of this approach is that there is no general requirement for labeling of GM 
foods. In contrast, the EU is adhering to the precautionary principle as they 
revise and develop their regulatory regime. Specifically the EU believes there  
is uncertainty about the long-run risk assessments of GMOs, the existing  





Although these opposing approaches have significant effect on regulation of modern 
biotechnology, the paradigms arising thereof have caused a dilemma that developing 
countries find difficult to reconcile when developing biosafety legislations. Moreover the 
US presumes GMOs to be safe until proved otherwise and the burden of prove lies with 
the consumer!
58
 Meijer and Stewart assert that the trade and regulatory GMO conflict 
between the EU and US has exacerbated existing differences with developing countries 
caught in the cross-fire of the GM cold war. Consequently, they argue, the GMO cold 
war has placed immense pressure on developing countries thereby undermining their 
abilities to make independent judgments and choices. They further argue that developing 
countries must address two key issues. Whether or how GM biotechnologies fits into 
their particular circumstances; and the extent to which developing countries may bar or 
restrict imports of GMOs yet be in compliance with international trade law, is a legal 




Second attempts to balance the potential benefits and potential risks create paradigms 
which make biosafety regulation especially in Africa, slow, problematic and expensive. 
For instance if a country must justify restrictions on GM imports on the basis of an 
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elaborate risk assessment, many developing countries might have to allow the import of 
GM products because they lack the ability to conduct such an assessment. Conversely, 
their own potential GM exports to developed countries might be barred by developed 




Third, the problems associated with biosafety or genetic engineering increase or change 
with new scientific inventions. The unpredictable nature of the risks and harmful effects 
of GMOs on the environment and humans is also closely interlinked with new and even 
existing inventions. A disturbing aspect arising from this scenario is identified by 
Kinderlerer who asserts that ‘science does not have all the answers’ relating to the risks 
associated with modern biotechnology. As a consequence, he argues, there is 
disagreement at the scientific level about the manner in which an inserted gene is likely 
to modify characteristics of the organism or its impact on the environment. This results in 
incomplete, imprecise or inconclusive scientific evaluation of the risks thereby making it 
difficult to determine with sufficient certainty what the risks actually are. 
61 
 Second, 
application of the precautionary principle (discussed in chapter two) has not been 
accepted in some jurisdictions including the United States the leading promoter of GMOs 
globally. 
 
Last but important, modern biotechnology raises critical ethical issues one of which is 
whether creating new organisms according to human will as opposed to natural laws of 
survival
62
 is legitimate? Sterckx asserts that both the scientific community and the 
general public have missed the mark on ethical issues attributable to genetic engineering. 
He argues that the public have lost the mark due to ignorance and as a consequence, 
public opinion is influenced by the media in distinguishing existing social concerns on 
one hand and specific moral concerns on the other hand. He contends that scientists have 
missed the point due to their failure to see the moral issues in science and their belief that 
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The concerns and other paradigms attributable to modern biotechnology have therefore 
placed South Africa and Kenya (and other African countries) in a delicate position when 
developing biosafety legislations. The multinational companies supported by their 
governments notably the US, work “behind the scenes”
64
 to ensure that their interests are 
sufficiently protected before any such legislation is passed. Delay is one of their favourite 
tools. Second, the Protocol (discussed in chapter two) is itself inadequate yet member 
states are under an obligation to comply with its provisions
65
 subject to retention of 




Attempts to implement the Protocol in South Africa and Kenya are not sufficient. It is 
imperative that the resultant legislation must be relevant and workable domestically. This 
is the litmus test, if such legislation is to be credible. 
 
1.4 Rationale for Regulation  
Regulation of modern biotechnology is intended to provide legal biosafety tools and 
mechanisms to safeguard the environment and humans from potential harm. Hence, the 
Protocol is concerned with ‘ensuring an adequate level of protection’ in the field of 
transfer, handling and use of LMOs resulting from modern biotechnology that may have 
adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also 




Tewolde observes that by virtue of their being new to nature, artificial modifications have 
potential ability to cause harm. As a result, he argues, regulation of their development 
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and use, as well as international trade in them, are absolutely essential.
68
 Kinderlerer 
argues that regulation is a response to the risks and hazards that come with new 
technologies, products and services and aims to ‘protect’ consumers and citizens from 
harm. He takes the view that today; technology requires regulation before it is made 





Other states saw a biosafety framework as a mechanism of enabling them to develop 
biotechnology in a sound and sustainable manner.
70
 It is also tenable to argue that cultural 
and ethical concerns and the increasing awareness of the risks associated GMOs have 
impelled public demands for regulation of modern biotechnology. Whether cultural and 
ethical considerations are catered for by the Protocol or national legislations is another 
matter altogether.  
 
Due to need for legal regulation of modern biotechnology, member states are under an 
international and treaty obligation to comply with the provisions of the Protocol, whether 
the Protocol is inadequate or not. Also considering that Kenya and South Africa are the 
leading promoters of GMOs in Africa, yet they must grapple with the competing 
imperatives that underpin biosafety legislation thereby taking different approaches in 
attempt to comply with the Protocol, an important research question arises. The question 
is: to what extent are current (in the case of South Africa) and proposed biosafety 
legislations in both countries at variance or consistent with the Protocol? 
1.5 Objectives of the Study 
Having posed the above question, the main goal of this study is to provide a comparative 
analysis of the biosafety legislation (current and proposed, as the case may be) in South 
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Africa and Kenya in the context of compliance with the Protocol. A comparison is in 
itself, not sufficient. Whether the resultant legislation is relevant and workable 
domestically, provides the litmus test of the effectiveness and credibility of such 
legislation. In order to achieve these goals, the following specific objectives are 
addressed:-  
 
(i) To provide an overview of international and African regional approaches to 
regulation of modern biotechnology 
(ii) To establish the extent to which current and or proposed domestic biosafety 
legislations, in South Africa and Kenya are consistent with or at variance with 
the Protocol. 
(iii) To assess whether the resultant legislation passes the litmus test of being 
relevant and workable domestically, if such legislation is to be credible. 
 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
Kenya and South Africa were chosen for this study by reason of being the leading 
promoters of GMOs in Africa and also for having pending biosafety Bills
71
 which 
provide comparable variables. The findings and recommendations of this study, if acted 
upon, will contribute towards improvement of the existing and proposed legislations. 
Second, the study is intended to assist the two countries share each other’s experiences 
and, where appropriate, replicate the credible aspects of either regime. The findings and 
recommendations may also assist other African countries which are in the process of or 
have no biosafety legislation to identify measures and mechanisms that are not workable 
in Kenya, and or South Africa, and thereby assist them to develop biosafety legislations 
that may be tenable right from the beginning. 
 
1.7 Scope and Limitations 
This is a comparative analysis of regulation of modern biotechnology in agriculture, in 
Kenya and South Africa, in relation to living modified organisms in the context of the 
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Cartagena Protocol. Transboundary movements of GMOs being an issue of global 
concern, international and African regional approaches to biosafety are examined so as to 
place regulation of modern biotechnology in its appropriate context. 
 
This study has some limitations though. It examines the biosafety Bill of Kenya 2005 
without policies and regulations which regulations can only be made .after the Act is 
enacted into law. Draft policies and regulations (if any) have not been published. The 
arguments advanced in relation to the proposed legislations in both countries, may not be 
relevant in the event that the proposed legislation, if and when enacted, shall be 
substantially at variance with the present Bills. Second, inordinate delay in enactment of 
the Bills occasioned by political or other considerations, may lead to a fundamental 
change in circumstances that may make the findings of this study inconsistent with or at 
variance with the changed circumstances. It important to note that environmental law is a 
political discipline
72
 and its issues and priorities change rapidly
73
. Last but important, due 
to limited space, it cannot be claimed that the discussion in this study is exhaustive. 
 
1.8 Outline of the Study  
Chapter Two comprises an overview of the international and Regional approaches to 
legal regulation of modern biotechnology. The Cartagena Protocol is examined in a little 
more detail as it constitutes the basis of comparison. The African Model law on biosafety 
is examined briefly as it sets an example of a viable biosafety regime that can be 
replicated by the member states of the AU that may have political ability and willingness 
to do so. 
 
Chapter Three comprises a thematic comparative analysis of the current and proposed (as 
the case may be) biosafety legislation in Kenya and South Africa in the context of 
compliance with Protocol by way of the Biosafety Bill of Kenya 2005, GMO Act and the 
GMO Amendment Bill 2005. The specific key features of the Protocol that form the basis 
of this study are: the objective and the precautionary principle, scope, institutions, 
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advance informed agreement, public participation, risk assessment and risk management, 
socio-economic considerations and monitoring. Chapter Four comprises the conclusions 
and recommendations. 
1.9 Design and Methodology 
This study is premised on a cross-national comparative study of domestic implementation 
of the Cartagena Protocol on biosafety in Kenya and South Africa. In order that the 
overall goal and the specific objectives are achieved, international and the African 
regional approaches to regulation of modern biotechnology are examined with a view of 
placing biosafety legislation in its appropriate context. A comparison of domestic 
implementation of the Protocol in Kenya and South Africa is then addressed. The 
Biosafety Bill of Kenya 2005 and the Genetically Modified Act
74
 together with the 
Genetically Modified Amendment Bill 2005 provide comparable variables. The 
conceptual framework illustrated in Figure 1 (page.18) guided this study and it is used as 
a tool of analysis. Each of the salient features discussed constitutes a theme. In chapter 
three, the relevant provisions of each theme are examined under the Protocol and under 
each country followed by a section on a comparative analysis at the end of each theme. 
 
Apart from limited personal oral interviews, this study is desktop based. The primary 
sources of data include relevant international instruments, applicable (current and 
proposed) domestic laws and regulations, guidelines and decided cases. Secondary 
sources include textbooks, journal articles and other relevant materials. Internet 
resources, newspaper reports and other reports will be used where they provide useful 
information. The existing laws and intended legislations shall be analyzed and 
comparisons done with a view of satisfying the objectives of this study. The study uses 
the strengths of the Protocol as the central point of reference and its weaknesses as part of 
the challenges to biosafety legislation in the two countries. Decided cases are analyzed 
where appropriate. A schematic illustration of the conceptual framework of this study 
follows and after which, international and regional approaches to biosafety are examined 
in chapter two. 
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Source: Generated by the writer. 
 
The above figure is an illustration of the conceptual frame work of this study. Whereas 
Kenya intends to comply with the Protocol by drafting the Biosafety Bill 2005, South 
Africa intends to do so by amending the GMO Act through the GMO Amendment Bill 
2005, The intersections “CBP, SA” and “CBP, KENYA” represent anticipated 
compliance with the Protocol by South Africa and Kenya respectively while the 
intersections shown as “South Africa (SA)” and “KENYA” represent anticipated variance 
with the Protocol respectively. The portion shown as “CPB, KENYA, SA” represents 
compliance with the Protocol by the two countries. The intersection shown as “KENYA, 
SA” indicates aspects of the two regimes that are consistent with each other (if any) but at 
variance with the Protocol. Note that at this stage the extents of consistency or variance 
have not been determined and so the different sizes of the portions and intersections in 
the above figure are not a representation of the extents of neither consistency nor variance 
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This chapter traces the origins of international regulation of modern biotechnology in the 
context of the Convention on Biological diversity (CBD) and the Cartagena Protocol (the 
Protocol). The Protocol is examined in a little more detail as it is the central point of 
reference in this study. Regional approach is limited to the Africa Model law which is 
examined briefly towards the end of the chapter. 
 
2.2 Convention on Biological Diversity 
Though it is possible to argue that Biosafety has its roots in customary international law, 
through the principle of harm prevention,
75
 international regulation has mainly developed 
through soft and hard law instruments. The Convention on Biological Diversity was the 
first international treaty to attempt international regulation of modern biotechnology.
76
 
Adopted in Nairobi on 22
nd
 May 1992 and signed at Rio de Janeiro on 5
th
 June 1992, the 
treaty is significant in the development of an international biosafety regulatory regime in 
two important ways. By comprehensively addressing biodiversity and recognizing it as a 





The three main themes
78
 of the Convention have been evaluated as: setting out the 
balance between conservation, sustainable use and sharing of benefits, thereby 
constituting the ‘the heart of the political agreement’ upon which the Convention is 
                                                 
75
  Birnie and Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2
nd
 Ed. Oxfprd University Press, 
      2002 Pg. 109. 
76
  Sands P, Principles of International Environmental Law, 2
nd
 Ed. 2003, Cambridge Uni. Press pp. 521. 
77
  Glowka L, A guide to the Convention of Biological Diversity, IUCN, 1994, pp. 1-3 
78
  Article 1 of the CBD sets out the three themes as :the conservation of biological diversity, 
    the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising  






. Issues concerning sustainable development are particularly critical in biosafety 
legislation as principle 15 of the Rio declaration puts emphasis on the precautionary 
approach as one of the key tools of environmental protection. Being a Protocol to the 
CBD, the Cartagena Protocol is not devoid of the attributes that form part of the legal and 
political character of the Convention.  
 
Second, the Protocol is only open to member states which are parties to the CBD
80
 hence 
already bound by the provisions of Article 19(3) and (4), articles 8 (g) and 17 of the 
Convention. These articles arguably constitute an integral basis of the Protocol.
81
Article 
19 (3) urges states to consider the need for and modalities of a Protocol setting out 
appropriate procedures including advance informed agreement(AIA) in relation to LMOs 
resulting from biotechnology that may cause adverse effect on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity. Apart from urging states to adopt a Protocol to 
specifically deal with safe transfer, handling and use of LMOs, the Convention gives 
guidance
82
on the issues that ought to be considered by the parties to such a Protocol. The 
Cartagena Protocol was arguably adopted upon the influence of the provisions of article 
19(3) of the Convention on Biological Diversity (the Convention or CBD) 
 
2.3 The Cartagena Protocol: An Overview 
The Protocol attempts to set forth the scientific and legal boundaries for national 
biosafety regulatory systems and establishes a minimum set of rules and procedures.
83
 It 
has also been described as ‘a cornerstone’
84
 and a centerpiece of an emerging global 
architecture designed to govern uptake of genetic engineering in agriculture.
85
 These 
attributes and others make the Protocol an important point of reference in issues of 
biosafety. Moreover member states are under a binding obligation to implement the 
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provisions of the Protocol in their domestic biosafety frameworks.
86
 Consequently, any 
intelligent comparative analysis of biosafety legislation in the two countries under study 
requires an understanding and balanced assessment of the tools, mechanisms; and the 




2.3.1 History and Negotiations Prior to Adoption  





 argues that the history behind the Protocol and its 
actual negotiation is rather complicated with a multitude of actors and many different 
processes involved. He further argues that due to the many processes and the complicated 
subject matter, it is impossible to outline the history behind the Protocol in ‘a satisfactory 
manner’.
90
 He however identifies five important phases. He terms the period between 
1970s and 1980s as problem identification period in which public concerns grew over the 
implications of GMOs arising from biotechnology; the second phase between late 1980s 
and early 1990s is regarded as a framework development period. During this period an 
international framework to address biosafety issues and biosafety guidelines for the 
release of organisms into the environment developed.
91
 The third phase is adoption of the 
CBD in 1992 which ‘planted the seeds’ of the negotiations on a biosafety Protocol.
92
 In 
particular, article 19(3) of the Convention provides thus: 
 
The parties shall consider the need for and the modalities of a Protocol setting 
out appropriate procedures, including, in particular, advance informed 
agreement, in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of any living 
modified organism resulting from biotechnology that may have adverse effect 
on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. 
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Although the wording of article 19(3) is persuasive rather than binding, this provision 
appears to have given impetus to the member states to adopt a biosafety Protocol in 
respect of modified living organisms.  
 
In November 1995 the second Conference of the Parties (COP 2) to the CBD met at 
Jakarta (the Jakarta Mandate) with a view of developing a framework for negotiations 
and to set a timetable and identify the elements to be negotiated.
93
 Overall, the Jakarta 
Mandate established an Open-ended Ad Hoc working group on biosafety (BSWG) 
specifically focusing on the transboundary movements of LMOs. Koester takes the view 




Three but important phases of the negotiation process followed the Jakarta Mandate. The 
elements definition phase in which the Ad Hoc Working Group (BSWG) held two 
meetings in 1996 and 1997;the drafting and negotiation phase spanning from 1997 to 
1999 pursuant to which draft articles were drawn and the final negotiation phase 1999-
2000.
95
 In February 1999 the sixth BSWG meeting of the open-ended Ad Hoc was held at 
Cartagena Columbia with a view of finalizing a text for the Biosafety Protocol to be 
approved by the first extraordinary meeting of the conference of the parties to the CBD 
(ExCOP) but this was never to be. According to Mayr, failure by the different negotiating 
groups, to make concessions in order to reach a consensus led to ‘considerable 
frustration’ and the ExCOP was suspended.
96
 Finally the Cartagena Protocol was adopted 
in Montreal on the 29 January 2000 and entered into force on 11 September 2003 after its 
50
th
 ratification. The Protocol has current membership of 134 states. 
 
2.3.2 Why Negotiations Stalled 
The negotiations stalled for a number of reasons. Pomerance observes that the wisdom of 
an international system of advance informed agreements (AIA) for agricultural products 
was a key issue that emerged at Jakarta which issue continued to hang over the 
negotiations for the next three years including the meeting at Cartagena. He argues that a 
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country such as the United States was worried on the trade restrictions imposed by the 
AIA requirements. The Advanced Informed Agreement (AIA) debate was central to the 
inability to conclude an agreement at Cartagena as the Miami group would not cede its 
‘economic interests’ to an agreement that was (in its opinion) unworkable. Pomerance 
further argues that though the USA is not a party to the CBD and hence the Protocol, it 
had substantial interest in the proceedings because the multilateral Protocol would 
regulate trade in GMOs a market in which the United States leads the world. Other 
factors suggested by Pomerance include the fact that no basic issues had been resolved 
prior to the arrival of delegates in Cartagena; and, the Protocol with potential impacts on 
trade, agriculture, food safety, science and the environment had to involve more than the 
representatives of biodiversity and environmental interests and such coordination had not 
been completely achieved by the time of the Cartagena meeting.
97
 It is therefore not 
surprising that the United States has, to date, not ratified the CBD as doing so is arguably 
not favourable to its commercial and political interests over GMOs  
 
The expectation that the Cartagena meeting would be the final round of the negotiations 
proved premature.
98
 The negotiating parties had different and opposing views on 
outstanding core issues.
99
 These included the AIA, labeling, and documentation, risk 
assessment and procedures of management, the treatment of non-parties to the agreement, 
scope of the Protocol, and the relationship of the Protocol with other International 
agreements including those under the World Trade Organization  
 
Burgiel identifies five major negotiating groups which emerged at Cartagena. The Miami 
Group comprising of Argentina, Australia Canada, Chile, Uruguay and USA represented 
the major actual or potential exporters of LMOs. This group generally supported a 
protocol limited in scope, based on strictly scientific procedures for risk assessment and 
as consequence, rejected inclusion of the precautionary principle. The second was the 
European Union which due to increasing public and political attention on biosafety 
supported a strong Protocol that embraced the precautionary principle and labeling of 
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LMOs. The third one was the like minded group which comprised of most developing 
countries except those in the Miami group. This group argued for an inclusive scope 
addressing LMO-FFPs, transit, contained use, pharmaceuticals, the precautionary 
principle, provisions on liability, labeling and socio-economic considerations. The fourth 
was the compromise group which included Norway, New Zealand Switzerland, 
Singapore and Mexico. This group generally sought a middle ground. The fifth one was 
Central and Eastern Europe whose spokespersons were Hungary and Russia. This group 
generally served as a swing role but frequently supported the final positions taken by the 




2.3.3 Stalled Negotiations: Implications 
The stalling of the negotiations has three important implications relevant to this study. It 
underpins the influence and effect of opposing commercial, political and other interests 
that member and non-member states strife to safeguard within the areas covered by the 
Protocol. It also confirms as Tallachini asserts, that translation of science into legislation 
is ‘a complex process’ which he attributes to many reasons two of which are key. The 
characteristic effects produced when a scientific proposition is transposed onto the 
normative language and the dissenting scientific opinions which make it difficult to 
determine the criteria to be used in evaluating and validating ‘good’ science occasioned 
by ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ uncertainties that exist in science.
101
 Thirdly, an interplay 
of the forces, contentious issues and the problems encountered during the negotiations of 
the Protocol cannot be ignored as they affect domestic implementation of the Protocol not 
only in South Africa and Kenya but also in many developing countries of Africa.  
 
For instance the United States is a Non-member State yet its participation
102
 and 
influence on the proceedings and the outcome of the negotiations of the Protocol was 
enormous and cannot be overlooked. Moreover failure of the United States to ratify the 
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CBD as a prerequisite of becoming a party to the Protocol while being the greatest global 
promoter
103
 of GMOs arguably hampers and complicates biosafety legislation in the two 
countries (and other developing countries in Africa). 
 
2.4 Salient Features of the Protocol 
The Protocol has tools and mechanisms that essentially determine its content and 
character. We shall examine the salient features under study with a view of laying a basis 
to ascertain the extent to which they are reflected in the current and proposed biosafety 
legislation of the two countries in chapters three of this study.  
 
2.4.1 Objective 
The objective of the Protocol is in accordance with the precautionary approach. Article 1 
of the Protocol provides thus: 
 
[T]o contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection in the field of the 
safe transfer, handling and use of modified living organisms resulting from 
modern biotechnology… taking also into account risks to human health,and 





The overall aim of the protocol is to ensure that countries receiving, exporting and using 
LMOs have the opportunity and capacity to assess possible risks to the environment 
(taking into account risks to human health) posed by the products of modern 
biotechnology.
105
 The unpredictable nature of the potential risks dictates that 
precautionary measures are taken so as to avoid or minimize such harm if and when it 
occurs. 
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2.4.2 The Precautionary Approach 
The precautionary approach is derived from principle 15 0f the Rio Declaration which 
provides in part  that where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for “postponing cost-effective measures 
to prevent environmental degradation”. 
 
Sands argues that although the principle is potentially the most radical and far reaching of 
the environmental principles, ‘its meaning and effect are unclear and remain mired in 
controversy.’ He observes that its supporters invoke it to justify pre-emptive international 
(and national)
106
) measures to address potentially catastrophic threats while opponents 
have decried the principle for allowing overregulation of a range of human activities.
107
 
Justice Stein argues that while the precautionary principle provides the philosophical 
authority to take decisions in the face of uncertainty, it will fade as a principle of 
international law unless given the teeth to enable it to be applied in the reality of a world 
environment subject to various assaults on all sides.
108
 The’ teeth’ must be provided for 
in domestic legislation. Whether the proposed biosafety legislations in the two countries 
do so, is doubtful. 
 
The principle helps to determine whether a risk is sufficiently foreseeable and serious, to 
require a response though it cannot determine what the response should be.
109
 Birnie and 
Boyle argue that these are policy questions which, in most societies are best answered by 
politicians and society as a whole rather than by courts or scientists. They observe that in 
determining whether and how far to apply precautionary measures states are obliged to 
take into account their own capabilities, economic and social priorities, the cost-
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The greatest temptation as Justice Stein observes is that domestic legislation frequently 
picks up the precautionary principle as an “objective or goal but (possibly deliberately) 
omits to give it a crucial role in decision making” and relegates it to no more than a 
guiding principle. He authoritatively asserts that the precautionary principle must be 
given “specific work to do” and decision makers need to be told “what the role of the 
principle is and how it should be applied” if the principle is to become operational and 
inspirational.
111
 In the absence of appropriate criteria (as it often happens) the 




Article 4 of the Protocol establishes the general coverage of the Protocol. It provides 
thus: “the protocol shall apply to the transboundary movement, transit, handling and use” 
of LMOs that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity, taking into also into account risks to human health. Under the 
Protocol LMOs are any living organisms(such as seeds trees or fish
112
) that posse a novel 
combination of genetic material introduced through in vitro nucleic acid techniques 





The Protocol’s AIA procedure is not applicable to LMOs in transit,
114
 LMOs destined for 
contained use in the party of import,
115
 LMOs intended for direct use as food or feed or 
for processing(LMO-FFPs),
116
 LMOs identified by COPs as being not likely to have 
adverse impacts.
117
 Also excluded from the Protocol’s provision on transboundary 
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movements are pharmaceuticals for humans that are addressed by other international 
organizations or agreements.
118
 It is important to note that even where certain LMOs are 
excluded from some or all of the Protocol’s provisions, a state may in exercise of their 
sovereign rights subject them to national regulation provided such legislation is 
consistent with the objective of the Protocol and that state’s other obligations under 
international law.
119
 In the case of LMO-FFPs, the provisions of Article 11 (procedure for 
LMO-FFPs) shall be complied with in addition to the foregoing. 
 
2.4.4 Institutions  
The Protocol essentially shares institutions with the Convention. The CBD Conference of 
the Parties (COP) shall under article 29 of the Protocol, serve as the meeting of the 
parties to the Protocol. When the COP to the CBD sits as a meeting of the parties to the 
Protocol, the body is known by the ‘cumbersome’ name ‘the Conference of the parties 
serving as a meeting of the parties to the Protocol (COP / MOP) and only parties to the 
Protocol participate in decision making.
120
 The third COP / MOP was held in Curitiba, 
Brazil in March 2006.This is the principal governing body of the Protocol with a wide 
range of important functions specified under article 29 which include keeping under 
review implementation of the Protocol. COP/MOP has the power to make, within its 
mandate, the decisions necessary to promote effective implementation of the Protocol. 
Arguably, the COP / MOP is (or ought to be) a powerful body that will play an important 
role in the ‘evolution’ of the Protocol as it has the power to undertake further work on 
some of the areas the Protocol text does not presently provide clear guidance.
121
 These 
include issues such as liability and redress which we shall examine shortly. 
 
Article 19 of the Protocol requires that “each party shall designate one national focal 
point…also designate one or more competent national authorities…responsible for 
performing” the administrative functions required by the Protocol. See further discussion 
at (3.4). 
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2.4.5 Advance Informed Agreement 
The biosafety Protocol divides LMOs into two groups for purposes of international 
regulatory action.
122
 Those subject to AIA procedure and those are not. Article 7 (1) 
identifies transboundary movement of LMOs for intentional introduction into the 
environment which must comply with the AIA procedure specified in articles 7-10, 12 
and 15. These require written consent of the importing state.
123
 The procedure for AIA 
involves three key stages. Notification in writing by the party of export,
124
 
acknowledgement in writing of receipt of notification by the party of import,
125
 a decision 
procedure
126





The AIA procedure set out in article 7 has been described as the chief regulatory 
technique designed to ensure that contracting parties are provided with the information 
necessary to make informed decisions before agreeing to the import of LMOs into their 
territory.
128
  Under article 7(1) the AIA procedure applies to the first intentional 
transboundary movement of LMOs for introduction into the environment of the party of 
import. This excludes LMOs that have previously been introduced into the environment 
of the importing state under the pretext that the importing state is estopped from laying 
claims of adverse effects if it never did so before the Protocol entered into force. The 
requirement for notification (subject to provisions of confidentiality in Article 21) and 
decision making,
129




The second category of LMOs is FFPs. These do not require AIA and are subject to a 
simple procedure. Under article 11 a party that makes a decision regarding domestic use 
of FFPs is only required to inform the parties through the Biosafety Clearing –House, 
within fifteen days of making that decision, provided the decision is consistent with the 
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objective of the Protocol and it does not apply to decisions regarding field trials. It is 




2.4.6 Public Awareness and Participation 
Public participation in the biosafety regulatory process is essential for purposes of 
consumer trust in that process.
132
  It has been recognized that on a general level, public 
participation consists of “attempts to influence law, policies and individual decisions” 
made by the government or regulatory bodies.
133
 Article 23 of the Protocol does not do 
more than give guidance to states on issues of public awareness and public participation. 
International basis of public participation is traceable to the three pillars enunciated in 
Principle 10 of the Rio declaration. These are the right of citizens to information, the 
right to participate in environmental decisions that affect them and their access to 
mechanisms of redress and justice when their rights are violated.  
 
Public awareness and public participation are issues of democratic governance whose 
quality will arguably largely depend on, though not limited to levels of: literacy, freedom 
of expression, the right and means of access to information, transparency and 
accountability, judicial independence and more significantly, the political will to promote 
and enhance public participation in decision making (both legally and in practice) at the 
domestic level.  
 
Gregory notes that many countries include, in their biosafety regulatory systems, the 
ability for the public to comment before a decision is made on a GMO application. 
However, he argues that making sure that the public is aware of that opportunity and 
providing the public with the knowledge and tools to make their participation meaningful 
is much more difficult. He takes the view that in developing countries, financial 
constraints, language barriers, and the lack of good communication vehicles makes 
implementing public participation requirements in a meaningful way much more 
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  It cannot be denied that these challenges and limitations are typical to both 
Kenya and South Africa.. 
 
2.4.7 Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment under the Protocol is to be carried out in a scientifically sound manner 
with a view of identifying possible adverse effects in the potential receiving environment 
taking into account recognized risk assessment techniques.
135
 It entails evaluation of the 
probability of adverse effects occurring and of their consequences.
136
 Being an entirely a 
scientific issue, the quality of risk assessment is largely dependant upon expertise
137
 and 
the resources necessary to achieve objective results. In Kenya and South Africa, this is 
done by way of environmental impact assessment (EIA) through the relevant laws and 
regulations.
138
 Rules apart, aspects of poor governance and corruption, in some cases, 
obstruct effectiveness and objectivity of the EIA process. 
 
2.4.8 Risk Management 
Among other things, the Protocol requires member states to “establish and maintain 
appropriate mechanisms, measures and strategies” to “regulate, manage and control 
risks” identified in the risk assessments under the protocol.
139
 What constitutes 
appropriate mechanisms, measures and strategies, is for individual states to determine 
and presumably in accordance to their local circumstances. However, it is apparent that 
the regulatory system envisaged by Article 16 of the Protocol must be functional and that 
the strategies must possibly be workable, practicable and reliable. Absence of or 
inefficient regulatory agencies will arguably frustrate the good intentions of Article 16. 
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2.4.9 Monitoring  
Each party is required to “monitor the implementation of its obligations under the 
Protocol” and to report to the COP/MOP, at intervals to be determined by the COP/MOP 
on “measures that it has taken to implement the Protocol”.
140
 Monitoring is crucial to the 
effectiveness of the Protocol since most of the obligations are not self executing and thus 
require “national measures, of a legislative, regulatory and institutional character” to 
enable their implementation.
141
 It has also been stated that “[m]onitoring is a necessary 
foundation for giving effect to environmental obligations”.
142
  It is further argued that in 
order for the parties to implement these obligations, it will be important to have “access 
to, or set up, reliable mechanisms of information gathering and data management” at 
national level.
143
 This suggests that a party needs substantive provisions in its domestic 
legislation relating to monitoring if it is to comply with the requirements of monitoring 
and reporting under the Protocol. Absence of provisions on monitoring may lead to 
inferences of bad faith on the party concerned. 
 
2.4.10   Key Unresolved Issues 
The Protocol has not been able to resolve all key issues and in some cases it does not give 
clear guidance. Balancing the competing and at times contradictory issues
144
 is by no 
means easy. The signing of the Treaty at Montreal was arguably intended to avoid 
collapse of the biosafety negotiations. Hence a compromise was necessary. As a result 
some key issues were not and still remain unresolved. Gregory identifies four of the 
unresolved issues as: “[w]hat the applicable safety standards should be, how to 
incorporate socioeconomic considerations, how to address food safety and how to 
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2.5 The African Regional approach to Biosafety 
The African model law was endorsed by the Organization of African Union Council of 
Ministers in Lusaka (Zambia) in July 2001. Adoption of the African model law especially 
after signing of the Protocol is arguably intended to serve four important purposes. It 
provides a holistic and broader regulatory biosafety regime with a view of filling some of 
the gaps
146
 left by the Protocol. These include provisions for enhanced public 
participation,
147
 clear identification and labeling of GMOs
148
 and a liability and redress 
regime based on strict liability.
149
 The scope of the model law is wider as it addresses 
genetically modified organisms (dead or alive) or a product of a genetically modified 
organism, 
150
 with the result that its provisions are likely to prevent or minimize dumping 
of products that have otherwise been rejected in the exporting countries. 
 
Second, the model law embraces the precautionary ‘principle’ as opposed to the 
precautionary ‘approach’. .
151
 Third, the model law establishes ‘uniform provisions
152
 
that apply to all types of GMOs whether they are intended for release into the 
environment for use as pharmaceutical, for food, feed or processing or a product of a 
genetically modified organism
153
; Four, it can be replicated by African countries that are 
unable to establish biosafety legislation due to financial or other constraints. 
 
Although the African Model law adopts an approach that avails higher protection against 
actual and potential risks, it is regrettable that African countries developing biosafety 
legislation have not significantly adopted the key provisions of the Model law into their 
municipal law. It is not convincing to attribute such failure to lack of a binding effect on 
the part of the Model law as much as to the vociferous opposition by the biotechnology 
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industry, and the double standards on the part of food producers who label their products 




                                                 
154





IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL IN KENYA AND 
SOUTH AFRICA: A COMPARISON 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter compares domestic implementation of the Cartagena Protocol (the Protocol) 
in Kenya and South Africa. Two main objectives are addressed here. The extent to which 
existing and proposed legislations are consistent with or  at variance with the Protocol 
and, the extent to which such legislation is relevant and workable in each of the two 
countries. Complying with the provisions of the Protocol in domestic legislation is in 
itself not sufficient. Whether the regime is relevant and workable domestically provides 
the litmus test of the effectiveness and credibility of such legislation. Unless the 
regulatory system is efficient, workable, fair and equitable,
155
 it will not serve any 
meaningful purpose and it is likely to be rejected. It has been argued that efficient 
regulatory systems minimize costs, functional ones make decisions promptly and fair 
regulatory systems treat similar products in a similar manner and decisions on similar 
products are consistent with one another while being fair and equitable to developers, 




The salient features that form the basis of this study were discussed in chapter two. Here 
we examine their implementation thematically and systematically beginning with the 
Protocol (in a few cases) Kenya, South Africa followed by a comparison for each of the 
themes under focus. The selected key themes under study are:, Objectives, Precautionary 
Approach, Scope, Advances Informed Agreement, Public Participation, Risk Assessment 
and Risk Management, Monitoring Liability and Redress and. In the case of Kenya the 
Biosafety Bill 2005 (the Kenyan Bill) is examined and in the case of South Africa, the 
Amendment Bill 2005 (the GMO Amendment Bill)
157
 are examined. Biosafety legislation 
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But first, an overview of constitutional and other legislative provisions relevant to 
biosafety in the two countries is necessary. 
 





 has no provision for an environmental right. However section 
70 of the Constitution provides for the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms 
of the individual, among them is the right to life. Interpretation from an environmentalist 
perspective suggests that protection of the environment is desirable in order to realize the 
right to protection of life. The Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act 
(EMCA)
159
 provides general principles which includes the provision that: “every person 
in Kenya is entitled to a clean and healthy environment and had the duty to safeguard and 
enhance the environment”. The Act also provides for environmental impact assessment 
(EIA), the precautionary principle, and public participation among others. In the absence 
of an environmental right, these provisions provide some biosafety support. It is hoped 
that if and when a new constitution is enacted
160
, the environmental right in EMCA shall 
receive appropriate recognition. 
 
3.2.2 South Africa 
Section 24 of the Constitution
161
 provides thus: “Everyone has the right- to an 
environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being” and to have the 
environment “protected for the benefit of present and future generations” through 
“reasonable legislative and other measures” that prevent pollution and ecological 
degradation and promotes conservation among other things. In the circumstances, it may 
be argued that the Constitution provides the foundation stone yet it is incumbent upon 
parliament to ‘lay’
 
the foundation by way of appropriate legislative and other measures.
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Further biosafety legislative support is also available in the provisions of the Promotion 
of Access to Information Act 
162
 (PAIA) that makes provision for a right to access to 
information, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act
163
 (PAJA) that makes provision 
for the right to administrative justice in the decision making process; and the National 
Environmental Management Act
164
 (NEMA) which provides for the principles that 
govern “the actions of all organs state that may significantly affect the environment”
165
, 
the duty of care
166




Undoubtedly, South Africa has a strong Constitutional and legislative framework which 
provides a favourable environment for the development of a holistic biosafety regime if 
there is political will to do so and the freedom to exercise that will (if any) We now turn 
to the selected key features. 
 
3.3 Selected Key Features: A comparative Analysis 
 
3.3.1 Objective 
Having discussed the objective of the Protocol in chapter two (2.4.1), it important to note 
here that stated objective(s) play critical roles in biosafety legislation. Apart from being a 
mechanism of avoiding or minimizing ambiguities, an objective reflects in clear terms the 
common purpose and intention of the legislature or the parties to an international treaty 
such as the Cartagena Protocol. The objective specifies what the parties intend to achieve, 
and in some cases, provides mechanisms
168
 on how to achieve it. In domestic legislation 
such an objective would arguably serve a significant additional purpose enhancing public 
confidence in and acceptance of biosafety legislation.  
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3.3.1.1   Kenya 
The objectives of the biosafety Bill of Kenya 2005 (Kenyan Bill) have two components. 
The first one embraces the precautionary principle (discussed in 2.4.2). It Provides thus: 
“in accordance with the precautionary principle, to ensure an adequate level of 
protection” in the field of “safe transfer, handling and use” of GMOs “resulting from 




3.3.1.1.1   The Precautionary Principle 
Kidd observes that the precautionary principle rests on the need to recognize that harm to 
the environment can be irreversible and therefore “it is better to avoid any possible harm 
to the environment than to try to remedy it later”.
170
 Considering that science cannot 
provide all the answers to the problems arising from genetic engineering and that the 
environment and the public are entitled to protection from the potential risks of GMOs, 
the precautionary principle arguably provides the only escape route in the event of 
scientific uncertainty.  
 
Whereas the Protocol provides for the ‘precautionary approach’
171
, the Kenyan Bill 
provides for the ‘precautionary principle’ as a tool of ensuring an adequate level of 
protection in the field of safe transfer, handling and use of GMOs. The question that 
immediately arises is whether the two terminologies are different or mean one and the 
same thing. It does appear that there is no consensus as to distinction or difference 
between the two terminologies.  
 
Birnie and Boyle argue that attempts to distinguish the approach from the principle points 
to the reality that the concept of precaution appears to mean different things in different 
contexts. They attribute the confusion to failure to distinguish the identification of risk 
from the entirely separate question of how to respond to that risk. According to the two 
writers, the precautionary approach (or principle) may mean that when faced with 
uncertainty states must be more cautious in identifying risks or it may mean that states 
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must be more cautious in taking measures to deal with those risks. However they take the 
view that developments in international law have adopted the precautionary principle as 
used in the former sense. Used in that sense, they argue ‘few commentators regard the 
difference as significant’.
172
 Sands contends that although the precautionary principle is 
potentially the most radical and far-reaching of environmental principles, its meaning and 




The controversy surrounding the meaning and effect of the precautionary principle 
explains why the Protocol adopts the precautionary approach ‘contained in Principle 15 
of the Rio Declaration’ to avoid ambiguity as already discussed in chapter two. That 
being the case and considering that the EU, Sweden and Germany
174
 prefer use of the 
‘principle’ rather the ‘approach,’ it tenable to argue that the use of ‘approach’ instead of 
‘principle’ was motivated by reason of offering more flexibility and being less restrictive 
than the ‘principle’
175
. However this does not necessarily solve the problem because 
“flexibility can create problems of certainty and precision”.
176
 Consequently use of 
‘principle’ in the Kenyan Bill instead of ‘approach’ used in the Protocol strongly suggests 
that Kenya has taken a more strict view of protection of the environment than the 
minimum criteria set out in the Protocol and thereby minimized uncertainty in its 
objectives. It appears that the Kenyan Bill emulates the position taken by the EU and the 
African Union (African Model law) as far as the precautionary principle is concerned. 
 
3.3.1.1.2   Transparency and Predictability 
The second component relates to transparency and predictability of the process that 
reviews and makes decisions regarding GMOs. It provides thus: 
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to establish a transparent and predictable process to review and and make 





This component sets minimum standards on decision making. This implies that the 
process must be open, and devoid of undue influence from commercial, political and 
other interests. It also suggests that in order to be predictable, the process must be 
understood, be popular and consistent in decision making. It has been argued that in “a 
functional and protective system” all interested parties “know and understand” the safety 
standard before hand and government decisions apply that standard in “a uniform and 
fair” manner.
178
  A transparent and predictable biosafety regulatory system must provide 
the public with information that include: a roadmap of the process and what is expected 
of the applicant, how the agency will conduct its review, where, when and how the public 
can be involved in the regulatory process.
179
 It is hoped that the regulations will shed 
more light on these imperatives. 
 
By requiring that the process be transparent and predictable the second component of the 
Bill successfully achieves three goals. It demonstrates that states (and in particular 
developing countries) are capable of taking action that is more protective than envisaged 
by Article 2(4) of the Protocol, for the conservation and protection of their biological 
diversity. Secondly, a transparent and predictable process sets the parameters and a firm 
legislative foundation of any regulations and guidelines that may be promulgated or 
approved pursuant to the resultant Act. Thirdly such a process is capable of being 
replicated in other African countries and thereby increasing the chances of establishing a 
unified biosafety regime as envisaged by the African Model law. By making provisions 
relating to transparency and predictability, the Bill goes beyond the minimum criteria set 
out in the objective of the Protocol. 
 
Although the objectives are clearly stated, achieving them or any part thereof is another 
matter altogether. As Paterson observes, prescribing and implementing legal doctrine are 
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two interrelated yet distinct tasks, the latter frequently proving far more challenging than 
the former.
180
 It is argued that achieving these objectives is largely dependant upon 
effective implementation and the requisite political will. 
 
3.3.1.2   South Africa 
Whereas the Protocol has a clearly stated objective, (and inspite of the critical role it 
plays) both the GMO Act and the Bill have none. The requirement to comply with the 
Protocol dictates that the Bill should have a stated objective. It would appear that since 
the precautionary approach being the central tenet of the objective under the protocol is 
excluded from the Bill, constructing an objective under the Bill without the 
‘precautionary approach’ would make the inherent inadequacies of the Act and the Bill 
obvious.  
 
Absence of provisions relating to the precautionary approach in the Bill, strongly suggest 
that the government has taken a strict view of the consequences of the precautionary 
approach and thereby ignored it. Considering that South Africa is the sixth in the 
hierarchy of top growers and promoters of GMOs globally, (and the leading in Africa)
181
 
it would be reasonable to argue that provisions relating to the precautionary principle 
may have been seen as unnecessarily prohibiting trade in GMOs. It has also been argued 
that the broad definitions of the precautionary principle allows for extreme interpretations 




Considering the importance of the precautionary principle in the protection of the 
environment,
183
 and bearing in mind the attention it attracted during the negotiations prior 
to adoption of the Protocol, its absence in the Bill not only offends Article 1 of the 
Protocol but it also a matter is of concern domestically and internationally. The 
immediate consequence of its absence in the Bill is that it defeats rather than enhances 
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the primary objective of complying with international agreements that the Bill sets out to 
achieve.
184
 It is argued that absence of the precautionary approach will establish a 
biosafety regime with lower thresholds than those permissible by the Protocol in relation 
to the safe transfer, handling and use of LMOs since application of the precautionary 
approach is the minimum criteria set by the Protocol. 
 
In any event, the constitution
 
requires that the environment be protected through 
‘reasonable and other measures’ inter alia to prevent ecological degradation and promote 
conservation.
185
 The environmental management principles under NEMA also require 
that ‘a risk – averse and cautious’ approach is applied which takes into account the limits 
of current knowledge about the consequences of decisions and actions.
186
 As a 
consequence, absence of provisions relating to the precautionary approach, strongly 
suggest that the intended amendments are superfluous and can only result into legislation 
that is not relevant and workable. 
 
 
By ignoring the precautionary approach, the Bill fails to appreciate the inherent scientific 
uncertainty of modern biotechnology. Further complications arise as, absence of 
provisions on the precautionary approach, deprive the Bill of an accepted and recognized 
key tool and criteria of biosafety legislation, which, has been endorsed by the member 
states of the Protocol. As a consequence legislation resulting from enactment of the Bill 
in its present form will not only be inconsistent with the Protocol, but it will lack 
transparency, predictability and credibility. 
 
3.3.1.3   A Comparative Analysis 
The objective contained in section 4(a) of the Kenyan Bill complies with Article 1 of the 
Protocol but only partially. That objective is lacking in two material ways. First, it 
ignores the important aspect of conservation of biological diversity and the element of 
human health. The absence of these two critical elements leaves a lot to be desired. 
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Considering that socio-economic considerations and public participation
187
 have been 
provided for in the Kenyan Bill
188
, it is improbable that protection of biodiversity and 
humans were intended to be excluded yet it is necessary that specific provision be made 
in terms of Article 1 of the Protocol. The Kenyan Bill takes an environmentalist 
perspective (ecocentric approach) which is characterized as placing more weight on the 
need to protect the environment and “where there is no conflict with such protection, 
human health”.
189
 An anthropocentric approach that places the environment within the 
sphere of human interests
190
 is desirable. Second, the objective contained in section 4(a) 
Kenyan Bill, is narrow in its application. To the extent that it does not encompass the 
regulation of import, development, transport, packaging, identification, export, contained 
use, release or placing on the market, it may be argued that the Kenyan Bill is restrictive 
save that other than identification and packaging, the other aspects are governed by the 
AIA procedure (contained in part three) of the Kenyan Bill. 
 
The second element concerns transparency and predictability. This is an important step 
towards enhancing efficiency, credibility and accountability of the decision making 
process. It minimizes abuse of the decision making process thereby increasing public 
confidence in the decision making of the NBA. It is evident that by including this 
additional yet critical element, the Kenyan Bill goes beyond the minimum criteria set by 
article 1 of the Protocol. 
 
In the case of South Africa, having ignored the precautionary principle, the GMO 
Amendment Bill has not made any attempt to comply with Article 1 of the Protocol. The 
biosafety regime that ensues from the Bill does not provide for the precautionary 
approach nor is there evidence anywhere in the Bill that the precautionary approach 
forms part of its regime. The fact that Bill is keen on and repeatedly provides for 
“scientifically based risk assessment” clearly demonstrates that character of the biosafety 
regime in South Africa may for along time, be lacking in the relation to the precautionary 
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approach. However the jurisprudence of environmental law in South Africa is taking an 
admirable trend which in many instances
191
 breaches the gaps and cures the inadequacies 
inherent in the GMO Act (current and proposed). The Constitutional and other legislative 
support (see 3.2.2 above) provide strong mechanisms that have enhanced environmental 
protection in South Africa. That being the case, the GMO Act, (together with the GMO 
Amendment Bill 2005), is left as mere permitting regimes for GMOs. Consequently, it is 
justifiable to argue that the GMO Act needs ‘overhaul reforms’ if it is to be tenable rather 
than piecemeal amendments. 
 
3.3.2 Scope 
Scope provides the parameters within which a treaty operates. It identifies aspects 
covered by the treaty and at times those excluded from the treaty. A treaty may also 
remain silent on some issues. We now examine Scope under the Protocol (briefly in 
addition to the discussion in (2.4.3) followed by Kenya and South Africa before a 
comparison is done. 
 
3.3.2.1   The Protocol 
Under the provisions of Article 4, the mandate of the Protocol is limited to living 
modified organisms as opposed to genetically modified organisms that encompass living 
and dead organisms. The effect is that in the case of an LMO, whereas a GM seed that 
falls within the scope of the Protocol is governed by the provisions of the Protocol, its 
flour or other derivative is not. In the case of a GMO, both the seed and its derivatives are 
covered under domestic law if the law provide for GMOs. 
 
3.3.2.2   Kenya 
The Bill applies to both living and non-living genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs).All the relevant sections (especially under part three of the Bill) refer to GMOs. 
Section 14(1) provides thus: “No person shall conduct…activities involving genetically 
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modified organisms without the written approval of the authority”. The preamble to the 
Bill defines GMOs as ‘any living or non-living organism that possesses a novel 
combination of genetic material…’ The Bill does not apply to GMOs that are 




By subjecting all categories of GMOs (covered by the Bill) to its permitting regime, it 
follows that GMOs intended for direct use as food or feed or for processing are not 
exempted from the only permitting regime established under the Bill. As a consequence, 
all food aids that have caused controversy in the past, must comply with the provisions of 
the Bill. Aid in the form of GMO foods has its own political implications. It is not 
surprising if these and other provisions that make the Bill appear restrictive, delay or 
even hinder enactment of the present Bill into law. 
 
However, section 3(1) with the title “scope of Act” is vague and ambiguous. It provides 
thus: “The requirements of this Act are in addition to the requirements imposed by any 
other Act”. This provision is superfluous to the extent that it lacks specificity. Those 
other Acts are not specified nor does the provision adopt the provisions of any of ‘those’ 
Acts. Section 3(2) is clear. It states thus ‘This Act shall not apply to genetically modified 
organisms that are pharmaceuticals for human use”. Whether the exclusion of 
pharmaceuticals is acceptable or not, is another matter altogether, but the provision is 
clear and unambiguous. One wonders why exclusion is stated unequivocally under 




3.3.2.3   South Africa 
Section 2 of the GMO Act states that the Act shall apply to:- 
(a) the genetic modification of organisms 
(b) the development, production, release, use and application of genetically 
modified organisms(including viruses and bacteriophages); and  
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(c) the use of gene therapy 
 
By making reference to GMOs rather than LMOs as provided by the Protocol, the GMO 
Act would appear set to cover a wider scope than the Protocol but that was never to be. 
The scope of the GMO Act has been framed in such a manner that it essentially negates 
the objective of the Protocol. The Act does not indicate in what manner, and for what 
purpose the Act applies to “the genetic modification of organisms”.  
 
The Protocol clearly provides that it is concerned with “transboundary movement, transit, 
handling and use” of GMOs that may have adverse effects on biological diversity, 
“taking also into account human health”. The GMO Act is silent on these aspects which 
are otherwise specifically provided for by the Protocol. What is of serious concern is that 
the GMO Amendment Bill which is specifically intended to make the GMO Act Protocol 
compliant, has no provisions relating to amendment of section 2 of the GMO Act. The 
effect is that the even after the GMO Amendment Bill becomes law, the GMO Act shall 




3.3.2.4   A Comparative Analysis 
Article 4 of the Protocol (discussed in chapter two: 2.4.3) has clear provisions relating to 
the harmful effects of transboundary movement, transit , handling and use of LMOs on 
biological diversity taking into account human health. However the Kenyan Bill is 
elusive and escapist in its provisions on scope in section 3(1) of the Bill. Failure to make 
specific provision leads to confusion and uncertainty. Section 2 (1) of the GMO Act 
makes provisions relating to scope but the scope is inadequate yet it is clearly intended to 
promote the development, production, release, use and application of GMOs. As a 
consequence, both regimes do not comply with the Protocol nor are they relevant and 
workable as the GMO Amendment Bill is intended to serve political purposes and hence 
cosmetic. 
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It has been stated that much of environmental law consists of setting out a framework for 
behaviour. It is concerned with who should make decisions, how they should make those 
decisions and what procedures must be followed.
194
 It is for this reason that institutions 
are important in the administration and enforcement of biosafety legislation and related 
matters. Effectiveness of such institutions therefore becomes critical. As discussed in 
chapter two (2.4.4), Article 19 requires that each party designates a competent national 
authority to perform the administrative functions required by the Protocol. We now 
examine the nature and character of the institutions in the two countries. 
 
3.3.3.1   Kenya 
Section 5 of the Kenyan Bill establishes the National Biosafety Authority (NBA),
195
 a 
body corporate with perpetual succession capable of suing and being sued.
196
 The NBA 
shall be managed by a statutory board whose membership is drawn from various 
government ministries and other government agencies. Membership of the board includes 
three experts from biological, environmental and social sciences.
197
 The Act empowers 
the NBA inter alia, to receive, respond and to make decisions on applications under and 
in conformity with the Act, keep a record of biotechnology and biosafety activities in 
Kenya and promote awareness and education among the general public in matters relating 
to biosafety.
198
 The board is empowered to appoint a chief executive officer (CEO)
199
 
who shall manage the affairs of the authority and shall be the secretary to the board. To 
the extent that the NBA coordinates all activities of GMOs visa–avis the regulatory 
agencies,
200
 the authority serves as an umbrella institution. 
 
By being a corporate entity, the element of legal competence is satisfied. Although the 
Bill does not make specific reference to the Protocol it empowers the NBA to coordinate 
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all activities involving genetically modified organisms (GMOs),
201
 establish contact and 
maintain liaison with other countries and organizations and also perform such other 
functions as may be necessary for the proper administration of the Act.
202
 The NBA has 
power to make regulations
203
 for the better carrying out of its functions and, it shall be the 
body responsible for issuing approvals in matters relating to GMOs
204
.. Considering these 
and other powers and functions of the NBA, an inference can be drawn that the authority 
acts both as the competent authority and the national focal point envisaged by Article 19 
of the Protocol.  
 
3.3.3.2   South Africa 
Section 3 of the GMO Act establishes the Executive Council of GMO (the council) as the 
competent authority
205





 of not more than ten persons shall be the national advisory 
body on all matters concerning or related to GMOs. The registrar appointed pursuant to 
article 8 of the GMO Act shall inter alia be responsible for communicating to the 
Biosafety Clearing House of the Protocol. 
 
3.3.3.3   A Comparative Analysis 
It has been argued that “in implementing environmental protection policies, regulatory 
agencies are carrying out a political balancing process”.
208
 Bell and McGillivray argue 
that law in practice is affected by the values and culture of those who make the rules. 
They argue that values “cover the things which are important to us and the priority we 
give to them”.
209
 In administering biosafety issues, they further argue, regulatory 
agencies must grapple with “guidance notes, circulars, official policy documents, codes 
of practice, even politician’s speeches” which have a marked effect upon the way in 
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which the law operates in practice.
210
 For instance, opponents of EIA in the developing 
countries label it a process that is “anti development, expensive or a mere paper tiger”.
211
 
Also political statements were made recently equating green laws in South Africa with 
‘butterfly eggs’ that slow down economic activity.
212
 These are tacit illustrations on how 
political statements may influence the functioning and effectiveness of regulatory 
institutions. 
 
Establishment of the NBA in the Kenyan Bill and the council in the GMO Amendment 
Bill are no doubt consistent with the provisions of Article 19 of the Protocol. However, 
the extent to which these institutions will be transparent and effective and devoid of 
political manipulation (domestically) is another matter altogether.  
 
Unlike the NBA which is a body corporate under the Kenyan Bill, the legal status of the 
Council in the GMO Act is not specified.
213
 Section 5(2) Kenyan Bill provides thus: “The 
authority shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession…capable of suing and 
being sued”. Section 6 of the Kenyan Bill further provides the chairman “shall be an 
eminent scientist, appointed by the minister” Section 3(3) of the GMO Act merely 
provides for the establishment of the Executive Council for GMOs and that the minister 
“shall designate a chairperson and a deputy chairperson from among the members of the 
council”. These provisions have two important implications. On the one hand, the 
Kenyan Bill creates a strong corporate legal entity (NBA) that is accountable as opposed 
to the GMO Act which is silent on the legal status of the Council. This explains why the 
registrar is usually sued on behalf of the Council.
214
 On the other hand, the Kenyan Bill 
obligates the minister to appoint “an eminent scientist” as the chairman (though 
regrettably gender insensitive). Under the GMO Act 
215
 the minister can, in exercise of 
his discretion, appoint a person who has no scientific knowledge to be chairperson or 
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deputy chairperson. The framing of the objective and functions of the Council both under 
the GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Act, arguably create the impression that the 
Council is a “mere rubber stamp” of the minister. Moreover the functions of the NBA 
specified in section 7 of the Kenyan Bill that include establishing: administrative 
mechanisms and a database, keeping a record of biotechnology activities, promoting 
public awareness and education among the general public, make the NBA a stronger and 
relevant body than the Council under the GMO Act. 
 
The Kenyan Bill makes provision for the appointment of the chief executive officer 
(CEO) whose principal function shall be management of the affairs of the authority and 
being the secretary to the board.
216
 Under the Kenyan Bill, the CEO has no substantive 
statutory powers to exercise in respect of GMOs. Unlike the GMO Amendment Bill 
which gives the registrar power to communicate with the BCH,
217
 the Kenyan Bill does 
not give the CEO such powers nor does it provide for communication with BCH. 
 
In contrast to the Kenyan Bill, the GMO Amendment Bill gives the registrar immense 
substantive powers which, unless checked, may be abused. A careful consideration of the 
powers of the registrar under the Bill suggests that in some instances the registrar 
exercises unfettered powers. The registrar is empowered to issue an extension permit for 
an activity in respect of GMOs for which a permit had previously been issued.
218
 
Exercise of this power inter alia offends the Provisions on monitoring (discussed at 2.4.9) 
envisaged by article 23 of the Protocol. It also implies that the registrar can extend a 
permit as a matter of routine. This provision is inadequate as it fails to appreciate the 
changes that may take place relating to the harmful effects of GMOs from the time the 
permit was issued for the first time to the time of an extension of the permit is sought. 
The consultation by the council referred to in section 5(2) (d)
219
 in respect to application 
for an extension permit, applies to the committee but, it does not appear to apply to the 
registrar Secondly exercise of that power by the registrar implies that a permit can be 
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renewed as many times as possible at the discretion of the registrar as no limit is placed 
on the number of times the registrar may renew a permit without reference to the Council. 
 
Although legally competent, both the NBA and the Council are agents of and subject to 
state control. In both institutions of Kenya and South Africa, the minister plays a critical 
role in two main ways. By appointing the chairman of the board or chairperson of the 
council, as the case may be, and by approving regulations made under the relevant Acts 
on biosafety. Section 6(a) of the Kenyan Bill provides that the council shall consist of “a 
chairman, who shall be an eminent scientist, appointed by the minister”. Similar 
provisions exist under the provisions of section 3(3) of the GMO Act. Arguably the 
minister has a political agenda to protect if and when circumstances dictate. This suggests 
that once the regulatory agency is a tool for political manipulation, that regulatory agency 
itself becomes the obstacle in achieving its objectives. Political manipulation is not a new 
phenomenon in the two countries. Within the Marine and Coastal Management (MCM)
220
 
of South Africa it is claimed that there is an exodus of highly qualified scientists who are 
unhappy with decisions taken on political rather than scientific grounds.
221
 In Kenya, 
heads of such institutions are sacked usually over the lunch time electronic media news 
bulletin. Other common factors that hinder effectiveness of the regulatory agencies in the 
two countries relate to governance,
222
, lack of sufficient experts and personnel, 
insufficient funding and corruption. The values these institutions give priority to and the 
interests they recognize and promote are critical in determining the success or failure of 
the biosafety regime of each country. 
 
3.3.4 Advance Informed Agreement 
The purpose of Advance Informed Agreement (AIA) is mainly to ensure that a party is 
aware of the adverse effects of an LMO (or GMO) before making a decision to import or 
not to import. It has been stated that AIA requires that before the first intentional 
transboundary of a specific LMO into its jurisdiction, the party of import, is notified of 
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the proposed transboundary movement; receives information about the LMO and its use 
and is given an opportunity to decide whether or not to allow the import of the LMO and 
upon what conditions (if any).
223
 Kiss and Shelton (in reference to prior informed consent 
(PIC) often used interchangeably with AIA) state that PIC is a procedural mechanism 
“utilized in advance of activities” in order to avoid potential conflict and reduce the risks 
of environmental or social harm.
224
 It has correctly been argued that only “transparent 
and comprehensive domestic regulations and procedures” can assist in clarifying some of 
the areas left unclear by the Protocol.
225
 We now examine AIA in Kenya and South 
Africa. 
 
3.3.4.1   Kenya 
The Bill does not have a specific heading on advance informed agreement (AIA). Instead, 
it prohibits dealings in GMO activities including transboundary movement of GMOs, 
without written approval of the NBA.
226
 Part three of the Bill prohibits contained use, 
introduction into the environment, importation and placing on the market and 
transboundary movement of GMOs without written approval of the NBA. The Bill 
provides for making application for each of the categories 
227
of activities involving 
GMOs. Upon receipt of an application the NBA shall within one hundred and fifty days 
acknowledge receipt of the application. Subject to seeking and considering public 
comments, carrying out risk assessment, and taking into account socio-economic 
considerations, the NBA shall communicate its final decision of approval or rejection of 
the application to the applicant within one hundred and fifty days of receipt of the 
application. In essence the process of AIA under the Bill takes a total of three hundred 
days. 
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3.3.4.2   South Africa 
The AIA is dealt with in two ways: under the Act and under the regulations. Section 4 of 
the GMO Amendment Bill substitutes section 5 of the principal Act in its entirety. The 
Bill does not contain a separate section dealing with AIA under the Act. Provisions 
relating to approval of applications are weaved with the powers and duties of the Council. 
The Bill makes provision for the procedure to be followed by an applicant and the 
decision making process. Section 5(1) (a) and (b) states thus: “The Council shall -where 
an applicant applies in the prescribed manner for a permit…in consultation with the 
committee, decide whether to approve an application…” The Bill makes provision of the 
issues to be considered when considering an application. The se are (subject to the 
provisions in the Bill), scientifically based risk assessment and proposed risk 
management measures, public input, EIA and socio-economic. If the Council is satisfied 
that the application conforms to the factors in section (1) (c) or paragraph (a) it shall 
authorize the registrar to issue a permit.  
 
Regulation 5(1) requires that certain activities relating to GMOs can only be conducted 
under authority of a permit issued by the registrar. These activities are specified as import 
and exportation, contained use, trial release, gene release and marketing of GMOs. The 
time frame
228
 within which the permit shall be issued is also stated for each of the four 
categories of activities. In this respect, it appears that the registrar usurps the powers of 
the council. 
 
3.3.4.3   A comparative Analysis 
Neither the Kenyan Bill nor GMO Amendment Bill adopts the approach provided for by 
articles 6, 7 and 11 of the Protocol. The two pieces of intended legislations provide the 
rules, factors to be considered and the procedures to be complied before an application is 
approved. None of the two Bills restricts itself to “the first intentional transboundary 
movement”. Part three of the Kenyan Bill repeatedly provides thus: “No person shall 
conduct…activities involving genetically modified organisms without the written 
                                                 
228




approval of the authority”. The GMO Amendment Bill is silent on first intentional 
transboundary movement.  
 
In relation to GMOs in transit, whereas Article 6 of the Protocol provides that AIA 
procedure doe not apply to GMOs in transit, the Kenyan Bill requires written approval 
from the NBA. Section 17(1) of the Kenyan Bill requires that “A person transporting 
through Kenya” GMOs “which are not destined for use in Kenya shall-apply for written 
approval”. The Kenyan Bill subjects GMOs in transit to approval, but both the GMO Act 
and the GMO Amendment Bill are silent on GMOs in transit. 
 
Time frames from notifications to final decision making under the Protocol takes a total 
of three hundred and sixty days but the Kenyan Bill reduces that period to three hundred 
days. Under the Protocol notification should be acknowledged within ninety days
229
 and a 
final decision made within two hundred and seventy days.
230
 Under the Kenyan Bill 
notification is acknowledged within one hundred and fifty days and a decision made 
within a similar period in respect of all categories of GMOs.
231
 In effect the Kenyan Bill 
reduces the total duration by sixty days.  
 
The approach of South Africa is different also. The current GMO regulations (Annexure 
Table 1) provide different time frames for approval of applications for different activities 
regarding GMOs. It provides thus: Importation and exportation of GMOs 30 days; 
contained use 30 days; Trial release 90 days and general release and marketing of GMOs 
180 days. The Protocol fixes the minimum period of acknowledging notification to be 90 
days and 270 days as the minimum duration of decision making. The duration provided 
for by the GMO Act is below the expectations of the Protocol.  
 
To the extent that GMO Amendment Bill does not provide for approval of applications 
for GMOs within a period comparable to that of the Protocol or any other reasonable 
duration as that provided by the Kenyan Bill, its transparency and credibility are 
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doubtful. Inclusion of substantive provisions on time frames in the Bill would give the 
AIA procedure more legal protection as opposed to leaving the procedure within the 
realm of regulations. The danger of failing to provide substantive provisions in the Act 
and leaving it to the regulations is that regulations can change from time to time as 
opposed to the substantive rules that can only be amended by an Act of parliament.  
 
As between Kenya and South Africa, the manner in which the two Bills deal with 
applications is interesting. Whereas the Kenyan Bill provides for “approval or 
rejection”
232
 of the application by the NBA, the GMO Amendment Bill only empowers 
the Council to “decide whether to approve”
233
 an application. A careful construction of 
the wording in section 5 of the Act
234
 technically suggests that the Council has no 
specific power to reject an application compared with the Kenyan Bill. Second, The 
Kenyan Bill makes it mandatory for the NBA to give and communicate to the applicant, 
the reasons for rejection of the application within one hundred and fifty days.  
 
Although the two countries have taken approaches that are substantially inconsistent with 
the Protocol in relation to AIA, the Kenyan approach gives sufficient protection to the 
AIA procedure. The procedure provided is clear and understandable. The approach of 
South Africa is vague, uncertain and ambiguous. 
 
3.3.5   Public Participation 
Public participation has been discussed at (2.4.6) but, three observations need to be made 
here. First, public participation involves many things including “access to, understand, 
evaluate, formulate and comment” upon proposals, plan and programmes. It therefore 
forms an integral part of decision making in environmental issues.
235
 It has also been 
recognized and accepted that public participation improves the quality of decisions, 
enhances environmental problem solving, promotes environmental citizenship and 
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  Third, public participation has many challenges. One 
such central challenge is “to ensure that the quality of the participation is sufficient” to 
actively engage the public and that “proper opportunity” is given to respond to any 
consultation exercise.
237
 On this basis, it is pertinent that provisions relating to public 
participation in biosafety legislation must be geared to achieving specific purposes, the 
ones identified above included. Under the (1998 UN/ECE) Aarhus Convention
238
, public 
participation must be timely, effective, adequate and formal and contain information, 
notification, dialogue, consideration and response. We now examine issues of public 
participation in Kenya and South Africa. 
 
3.3.5.1   Kenya 
The Kenyan Bill gives the public an opportunity to participate in process of decision 
making in two ways: providing an opportunity to respond in relation to each application 
for the release into the environment of a GMO
239
 and partial access to information of 
portions of the applications that are not regarded as confidential.
240
  Section 21 (1) and 
provide thus: “The Authority shall publish in the Kenya Gazette and in at least two 
newspapers of nationwide circulation” and section 21(2) provides thus: “The public may, 
within thirty days…respond to the notice and the Authority shall address appropriately 
any relevant concerns raised by the public”. 
 
The Bill presumes that advertising in the Kenya Gazette and two newspapers constitutes 
sufficient notice to interested, affected persons and the public. The immediate question 
that arises is how accessible these papers are? The Kenya Gazette is an official 
government document that is printed at the government printers in Nairobi (and sold at a 
fee) and usually distributed to the judiciary and a few other government offices. In many 
instances the general public does not know the existence let alone the content of that 
document. Even if the general public were to know of its existence, many of the people 
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would not afford to purchase a copy. The draft constitution 2005 dubbed the Wako draft 
is the first and only government Gazette document the writer is aware of which was 
distributed ‘free of charge’ in 2005. The general public had to be taught
241
 and guided on 
its content and effect before the document was rejected in a referendum held towards the 
end of 2005. 
 
The requirement of two newspapers of nationwide circulation has its own problems. 
These are newspapers meant for commercial purposes and are mostly available to the 
elite. In most of the remote agricultural areas where GMOs are likely to be grown, many 
farmers do not get access to nor can some of them afford to purchase newspapers. The 
situation gets worse during the long or heavy rains when most of the remote areas are not 
accessible. In as much as communication through the newspapers may be appropriate 
though not sufficient, accessibility and literacy levels are some of the barriers to effective 
communication.  
 
Section 21(3) of the Kenyan Bill makes provision for access to portions of an application 
that do not qualify as confidential information. This provision enables the general public 
to get access to some of the information contained in the application which would 
otherwise not be obtainable in the absence of such a provision. The information contained 
in any such a portion may assist the members of the public who wish to respond to make 
reasoned comments. 
 
3.3.5.2   South Africa 
The GMO Act has no substantive provisions relating to public participation. Currently 
public participation is provided for in limited ways in the GMO regulations.
242
 The 
regulations require that “The applicant shall notify the public of any proposed release of 
genetically modified organisms prior to the application for a permit for such release”.
243
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This is to be done by publishing a notice in at least three newspapers circulating in the 




3.3.5.3   A Comparative Analysis 
The biosafety Bill of Kenya complies with the provisions of the Article 23 in two 
important ways. Section 42 (1) of the Bill provides for public awareness and 
participation. The Bill provides for binding obligations by requiring that “The Authority 
shall promote public awareness and education concerning biosafety matters”. On access 
to information section 21(3) provides for access to information that does not qualify as 
confidential in any application and section 42(2) requires thus: “The Authority shall 
publish notices of final decisions concerning all applications”.  
 
Although the Kenyan Bill appears promising, it is argued that in the local context, the 
provisions relating to public participation in decision making are inadequate. 
Advertisement in the Kenya Gazette and two newspapers cannot of itself avail the 
transparency and predictability envisaged in the objectives of the Bill. The advertisement 
provided for does not target large numbers of the public as to enable the NBA to rely on 
such advertisement alone as a basis of concluding that the public is sufficiently aware of 
such an application. Moreover, it appears that advertisement is to be done only once.  
It is suggested that inclusion of communication through electronic media will enhance 
communication for purposes of satisfying the requirements of section 21 of the Kenyan 
Bill. The Bill should take advantage of the increasing electronic media houses in Kenya 
to achieve that purpose. The period of thirty days within which the general public may 
make comments also appears inadequate. Activities involving GMOs are intricate even to 
the experts. Hence reasonable time should be given to the general public to consider the 
notices and make comments. It is also necessary that provision be made for holding a 
public meeting (baraza)
245
 at the intended scene to enable the poor peasants express their 
views as well.  
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In relation to public participation, South Africa has taken a somewhat different approach. 
The GMO Act has no provisions relating to public participation (see below). Currently 
public participation is provided for in limited ways in the GMO regulations.
246
 Section 
6(4) of the  regulations require an applicant for a permit to notify the public of any 
proposed release of GMOs prior to the application for a permit for such release by 
publishing a notice “in at least three newspapers circulating in the in which the proposed 
release is to take place”. There is no requirement to publish any such notice in the 
government Gazette as in the case of Kenya.
247
 Section (6) (6) requires the registrar to 
refer any comments or objections received from interested parties to the Council. 
Although the council is required to “consider all the comments and objections” when 
considering an application for release of GMOs
248
 but there is no corresponding duty to 
publish the decisions concerning applications. 
 
Even in these limited ways the regulations merely offer lip service to public participation. 
The regulations were made without a biosafety policy in place, (a similar predicament of 
the Bill). Public participation is apparently directed to a section of the public that has 
access to the print media only. No provisions are made as to the period within which such 
comments are to be made and in what manner. It may also be argued that the requirement 
to ‘consider’ the comments from the public (in granting or refusing an application for a 
permit by the council) is vague and may not be of any practical value unless the final 
decisions are published (as provided by S. 25 of the Kenyan Bill). This may reduce the 
expenses and time involved in seeking judicial remedies. 
 
As indicated above, the Bill also has no substantive provisions on public participation. It 
provides thus: 
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The council may before making a decision regarding an application submitted 
in terms of this section consider the following factors: 
i. public input 
ii. the environmental impact assessment or 
iii. the potential socio-economic impact of such activities249 
 
 
The term public ‘input’ is not defined. In any event public input cannot be a substitute for 
the public awareness and participation envisaged by the Protocol unless a broader 
definition is to be provided. Unlike the Biosafety Bill of Kenya
250
 which requires the 
NBA to “promote public awareness and education concerning Biosafety matters”,
251
 the 
GMO Amendment Bill of South Africa does not contain similar provisions. Lack of such 
or any other similar provisions arguably absolves the government, whether intentionally 
or not, from its treaty and national responsibility to promote and facilitate these essential 
tenets of public participation. Moreover the reference to ‘public input’ is only limited to 
decision making in respect to an application for a permit and the provision to consider 
public input is discretionary as it uses the word “may” as opposed to the Kenyan 
mandatory one which uses the word ‘shall’.  
 
Both the GMO Act and the GMO Amendment Bill of South Africa are far from 
complying with the Protocol insofar as public participation is concerned. On the other 
hand, by failing to provide for publication of the final decision, the Act is not only 
inconsistent with Article 23(2) of the Protocol, but it is also inconsistent with section 32 
of the Constitution which provides for the right to access to information and the 
provisions of PAIA. To this extent it is tenable to suggest that issues of public 
participation ought to be addressed if biosafety legislation of South Africa is to comply 
with the Protocol and also be acceptable and meaningful domestically. Failure of the Act 
to provide for public participation can be regarded as fatal to the biosafety legislation of 
South Africa. The provisions in the GMO Amendment Bill can, in the words of Bell and 
McGillivray, be regarded as “icing on the cake”.
252
 Moreover, information provision and 
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the enabling of participation are central to ensuring that biotechnologies become 




In relation to both regimes, whereas under the Kenyan Bill it is the obligation of the NBA 
to conduct the public participation, under the GMO Act that obligation is imposed on the 
applicant. The NBA is required to publish the notices in the government Gazette and 
receive the comments from the public within thirty days and “shall address appropriately” 
the relevant concerns raised by the public”. In the case of South Africa, the GMO 
regulations require the applicant to publish the notice in three newspapers circulating in 
the relevant area and the registrar shall refer the comments or objections to the Council. 
The Council shall consider “all the comments and objections when considering an 
application for release”.  The Kenyan Bill uses the words “shall address appropriately” 
the concerns raised whereas the GMO regulations requires the Council to “consider” the 
comments and objections raised.. The difference between the two terminologies may not 
be as material as the extent to which the concerns raised are taken into account in the 
decision making. Since the GMO regulations do not provide for publication of the 
decision reached by the Council it is difficult to tell whether and the extent to which the 
comments and concerns raised have been taken into account. 
 
3.3.6 Risk Assessment and Risk Management 
The objective of risk assessment is to identify and evaluate the potential adverse effects 
of LMOs in the likely potential receiving environment taking also into account risks to 
human health.
254
 It has been argued that the nature and extent of risk to the environment 
and human health is one of the factors placed into a balance in environmental decision 
making.
255
 Risk assessment and risk management are sensitive issues in biosafety 
legislation. We now compare the approaches of Kenya and South Africa. 
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3.3.6.1   Kenya 
Risk assessment under the Bill is conducted by the NBA. Section 22(3) provides thus: 
 
The authority shall conduct a risk assessment as required and shallaudit risk 
assessment information submitted by the applicant 
 
The risk assessment shall be undertaken as set out in the fifth schedule of the Bill.
256
 The 
fifth schedule provides the objectives and the general principles governing risk 
assessment. Whereas the objective of risk assessment under the fifth schedule is to 
identify and evaluate the potential adverse effects of GMOs on the environment, it also 
enables the authority make informed decisions. In relation to the general principles, two 
such principles require special attention. Risk assessment shall be carried out in a 
scientifically sound and transparent manner. Two lack of scientific knowledge or 
scientific consensus shall not necessarily be interpreted to indicate a particular level of 
risk, an absence of risk or an acceptable risk. (See the discussion on these two principles 
in chapter two). 
 
The NBA has the onerous task of undertaking a transparent risk assessment. Two aspects 
may enable the NBA to achieve this objective. It has the power to appoint such officers 
and other staff as are necessary for the proper discharge of its functions.
257
 Second, it has 
the power to either generally or in any particular case, delegate the exercise of any of its 
powers under the Act to persons including any officer.
258
 A combination of these two 
provisions suggests that the NBA may recruit or contract an expert to carry out the risk 
assessment or use its own staff.  
Whether the risk assessment shall be transparent is a matter of fact that may be deduced 
from the appeals and judicial challenges that may ensue. In the alternative or in addition, 
scrutiny by an independent assessor or the public (none of which is provided for) may 
also provide a test in that regard. Although the NBA is obligated to publish the 
application for purposes of public comments, there is no provision for publishing the final 
decision. This means that the public have an opportunity (though limited) to participate in 
                                                 
256
  The fifth schedule of the Kenyan Bill. 
257
  Section 12 Kenyan Bill 
258




the process of decision making but they do not have a corresponding opportunity to know 
the final decision made by NBA. In order for public participation to be meaningful and 
transparency to be achieved, it is imperative that the final decision of the NBA be 
published as well. Arguably, publication of the final decision is an essential element of 
the transparency and predictability envisaged by the objectives of the Bill.  
On risk management section 22(4) of the Kenyan Bill imposes an obligation on the NBA 
to “indicate any measures to be taken to ensure the safe use” of the GMO upon 
completion of its report on risk assessment, while section 22(5) requires the authority to 
“liaise” with the appropriate regulatory agency “to ensure that measures are in place to 
manage and control risks identified during the risk assessment process”. In cases of 
unintentional release into the environment the regulatory agency “with knowledge” of 
such unintentional release shall “within twenty-four hours” when the regulatory agency 
knew of the introduction, report to the NBA.
259
 However the Bill does not indicate the 
manner of reporting such an accident. 
 
3.3.6.2   South Africa 
Neither the current GMO Act nor the GMO Amendment Bill contains substantive 
specific provisions governing risk assessment. The Act merely empowers the council to 
call for a risk assessment.
260
 Section 5(a) of the current Act provides thus: “the council 
may–require any applicant for a permit… to submit to the Council…an assessment of the 
risk” Bu the GMO Amendment Bill removes that power and instead provides that “the 
Council shall-…determine whether the applicant must, in addition to his or her 




A careful analysis of these provisions together with the provisions of section 5(2) (a), 
makes it apparent that EIA is not mandatory under the biosafety regime, (the provisions 
of NEMA apart). It has been argued that the power to determine provided for in section 
5(1) (a) of the Act
262
 is of a narrow application as most of the permitted activities do not 
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involve genetic modification, such as import, export or release of a GMO.
263
 The problem 
is exacerbated as GMOs are only subject to a basic assessment
264
 as opposed to scoping 
and EIA. 
265
 It has authoritatively been stated that EIA is fundamental to any regulatory 
system which seeks to prevent or minimize environmental harm as it provides decision 
makers with information about possible environmental effects.
266
 By exercising his 
discretion to subject GMOs to a basic assessment ,
267
 the minister arguably takes a lesser 
strict view of the potential harm of GMOs thereby exposing the bias of the Act and the 
Bill in aggressively promoting GMOs in South Africa rather than taking a holistic 
approach so as to consider and accommodate all other relevant factors. 
 
Both the Act and the Bill embrace risk assessment carried out in a scientific manner. This 
is clear as all the relevant sections repeatedly refer to ‘scientifically based risk 
assessment’.
 268
 Considering that genetic engineering is scientific in nature, it is only 
practicable that risk assessment is carried out in a sound and scientific manner. Arguably, 
that may not be problematic in itself. Problems arise when (as in the present case) 
decision making is based purely on the scientifically based risk assessment to the 
exclusion (or inadequate consideration) of other pertinent and relevant factors such as 
socio economic considerations.  
 
The GMO Amendment Bill empowers the council to take into consideration the scientific 
based risk assessment and proposed risk management measures in considering an 
application.
269
 Two observations need to be made in respect to this requirement. First it 
excludes socioeconomic considerations (which are discussed below) when considering an 
application. Secondly the provision relating to lack of scientific knowledge or scientific 
consensus having no effect on risk assessment confirms the uncertainty inherent in 
modern biotechnology. Having recognized so, there is no justification for failure of the 
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Bill to make specific provisions for application of the precautionary approach discussed 
above. However, considering that South Africa is the sixth top grower of GMO crops 
globally (and the leading in Africa),
270
 it is unlikely that a restrictive risk assessment 
regime will be promoted. In any event there are no provisions for subjecting the risk 
assessment to an independent assessor (save for the NEMA regulations) or auditing hence 
raising questions of accuracy and transparency of such assessments. 
 
On risk management, neither the GMO Act nor the GMO Amendment Bill contains 
provisions on the risk management. Only the regulations make provision for accidents 
arising from GMOs and require that “the registrar is notified immediately both verbally 
and in writing” of such an accident.
271
 There are no requirements for monitoring an LMO 
for a period commensurate to its life–circle or any other period before it is introduced to 
the environment or released for commercial purposes as required by the Protocol.
272
 This 
implies that an LMO can be released so long as the requirements as to risk assessment are 
complied with for purposes of obtaining a permit. This situation suggests that neither the 
Act nor the bill is geared towards protection of the environment and human health insofar 
as risk management is concerned. 
 
3.3.6.3   A Comparative Analysis 
Although the Protocol adopts a scientific approach and, provides no substantive guidance 
on scientific uncertainty in relation to risk assessment,
273
 it does not inhibit the sovereign 
right of a state to take action that is more protective of its biological diversity.
274
 
Moreover the Protocol gives a wide discretion to states to take ‘appropriate legal, 
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Whereas risk assessment under the Kenyan Bill is conducted by the NBA, the GMO Act 
has no specific provision as to who should conduct risk assessment. However from the 
wording of section 5(1) the applicant shall be required to submit “an assessment on the 
impact on the environment” if the Council determines that such an assessment needs to 
be submitted implies that it is the responsibility of the applicant to conduct an 
assessment, in case it will be needed. As noted above the Kenyan Bill makes specific 
provision empowering the NBA to conduct a risk assessment.
276
 The requirement to 
“audit risk assessment information” submitted by the applicant would suggest that the 
applicant must have already done a risk assessment of his own. Otherwise the applicant 
would hardly provide information on “suggested methods for safe handling, storage, 
transport and use” required under the fourth schedule of the Kenyan Bill. Auditing the 
risk assessment information submitted by the applicant is presumably intended to confirm 
whether the risk information submitted by the applicant is consistent with or at variance 
with the findings of the risk assessment carried out by the NBA. 
 
The Kenyan Bill is silent on who pays the costs of the risk assessment. However, since 
the NBA is obligated to carry out risk assessment, a reasonable inference may be drawn 
that the authority bears the costs. In as much as the NBA may have the expertise and 
personnel (and this doubtful), lack of funds is likely to be a barrier in some instances. It 
should be noted that environmental issues compete for funds with critical ministries such 
as defence, health and education, only to mention a few. There is usually a likelihood of 
giving environmental issues less attention when it comes to government funding. In such 
cases, the NBA may lack sufficient funds and thereby do shoddy work (or none at all) 
thereby affecting the quality of the risk assessment to be carried out. 
 
On risk management section 22(5) of the Kenyan Bill requires the NBA to liaise with the 
appropriate regulatory agency “to ensure that measures are in place to manage and 
control risks identified during the risk assessment process”. In contrast, the GMO 
Amendment Bill provides that in considering an application the Council shall have regard 
to “proposed risk management measures”. The approach contained in the Kenyan Bill is 
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advantageous for two reasons. The risks to be managed are those the NBA identified 
itself. Second, the appropriate regulatory agency is in one way or the other accountable to 
the NBA. In the case of South Africa, the GMO Amendment Bill only requires that the 
proposed risk management measures are considered when considering an application. 
The powers entrusted to the registrar under the provisions of section 9(d) 
277
of the Act 
may be exercised to ensure that “all users apply the appropriate measures to protect the 
environment and human and animal health during the exercise of any activity” with 
GMOs. Yet this is premised on the condition that “the registrar satisfies himself or 
herself” that all such measures are applied. 
 
Compared with the provisions of the protocol on risk assessment (discussed in chapter 
two) it would appear that the Kenyan Bill sufficiently adopts the criteria provided in 
Annex III of the Protocol. The provisions of the fifth schedule of the Bill are in material 
aspects, similar to the provisions of Annex III of the Protocol. However whereas section 
six of Annex III provides for the carrying out risk assessment on case by case basis, the 
Bill is silent regarding the same. 
 
Provisions on risk management in both countries are lacking in material aspects. Neither 
the Kenyan Bill nor GMO Amendment Bill has provisions requiring that a GMO 
undergoes observation commensurate to its life-circle before it is put into its intended 
use. Although the Protocol’s use of the word “endeavour to ensure”
278
 suggests that this 
obligation is not mandatory, it is nevertheless reasonable that such a provision be 
included in the resultant legislation if an adequate (or a more protective) level of 
protection is to be achieved as envisaged in section 4(a) of the Bill as read with Article 
2(4) of the Protocol.  
 
From the foregoing it would justifiable to assert that, the GMO Amendment Bill is far 
from complying with the Protocol insofar as risk management is concerned. Whether new 
or revised regulations are to contain rules on risk management, such rules will not be a 
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substitute for substantive provisions of law. In any event, any such regulations will be 
subject, to the discretionary powers of the Council and the Minister. 
 
Absence of adequate provisions on risk management in the GMO Amendment Bill may 
be cured by an array of the provisions of section 28 NEMA, on duty of care.
279
 The duty 
of care imposes an obligation on every person who causes, has caused or may cause 
significant pollution or degradation of the environment, to take reasonable measures to 
prevent such pollution from occurring, continuing or recurring. Though NEMA may, cure 
some of the deficiencies on risk assessment and risk management inherent in the GMO 
Amendment Bill, the provisions in NEMA cannot be a substitute for biosafety legislation. 
 
3.3.7 Socio-Economic Considerations 
Although the scope of socio-economic considerations to be taken into account under 
Article 26 of the Protocol is narrow, its provisions are clear and specific though weak by 
reason of use of the words “may take into account”. The importance of socio-economic 
considerations in the decision making process cannot be underscored. Failure or 
insufficient consideration of socio-economic factors in decision making, offends the 
principle of intergenerational equity. Maggio asserts that intergenerational equity 
constitutes a bridge for recognized mutual interests between environmental protection, 
socio-economic development and human rights law. Hence, further observes, striking a 
balance between current consumption and foregoing use of resources for future 
generations, has been a consideration of all societies.
280
. Kenya and South Africa have 
taken different approaches as seen below. 
 
3.3.7.1   Kenya  
The Kenyan Bill makes consideration of socio-economic factors mandatory.
281
 This, it is 
argued, is the main driving force on socio-economic considerations in the Bill. The Bill 
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requires that in reaching a final decision, the NBA “shall take into account” several 
factors one of which is the socio-economic considerations arising from the impact of 
GMOs on the environment.
282
 No further details are given. It has been argued that for the 
biosafety regulatory system of Kenya to be fair predictable and transparent, the details 
surrounding the inclusion of socio-economic considerations should be spelt out in more 
detail than is currently available in the Kenyan Bill.
283
 However, failure to provide details 
cannot be dismissed as having an entirely negative effect. It may be understood to imply 
that the Bill gives the NBA wider discretion in determining which socio-economic 
considerations are relevant and applicable in a particular ecological or other setting. 
Secondly, the details can be provided for in the regulations and policy once in place.  
 
Whereas the Protocol is concerned with the impacts arising from LMOs the Kenyan Bill 
not only complies with the Protocol in that respect, but it goes beyond the criteria set by 
the Protocol. It requires that the socio-economic considerations are those that arise from 
GMOs. This means that the Protocol in concerned with impacts of living organisms only 
while the Kenyan Bill applies to impacts of both living and non-living organisms on the 
environment. However the Bill is lacking insofar as it does not put emphasis on the value 
of biological diversity to the indigenous and local communities. The Bill may have 
deliberately avoided reference to “indigenous and local communities” probably for 
historical and political reasons. Apparently, determining who is and who is not 
indigenous is a sensitive political question to answer in Kenya today, especially when 
looked at from indigenous land rights in the context of colonialism. In any event the 
present wording of section 24(1) (e) is all-encompassing  and as the word “environment” 
has  many definitions,
284
 it does not exclude the interests of the indigenous and local 
communities envisaged by Article 26(1) of the Protocol. 
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3.3.7.2   South Africa 
The current GMO Act is silent on socio-economic considerations in decision making. 
Section 5(g) of the Act provides that after consideration of the “risk assessment” and 
where required, “the environmental impact assessment”, the council may authorize the 
registrar to issue a permit for the purpose for which the application was made or for the 
release of a GMO into the environment. By stating what is to be considered in making a 
final decision, the Act out rightly ignores socio-economic considerations.  
 
The GMO Amendment Bill 2005 introduces socio-economic considerations into the 
decision making process but in a weak and inconsistent manner. Section 5(1) (a) states 
thus: 
 
The council shall-where an applicant applies…for a permit…determine 
whether that applicant must, in addition to his or her application, submit an 
assessment of the impact on the environment and socio-economic 




It is clear from this provision that socio-economic considerations are to be considered 
only when the council has determined that an assessment of socio-economic 
considerations is necessary Moreover section 5(2)(a)
286
 provides that when making a 
final decision the council “may” consider public input, environmental impact assessment 
or
 
 the potential socio-economic impact of such activities. 
 
 
A careful construction of the wording of section 5(1) (a) and section 5(2) (a) 
287
clearly 
suggests that in making a final decision, the council may consider either EIA or the 
potential socio-economic impact of such activities but not both. In any event, in some 
instances socio-economic considerations may not be taken into account. This is possible 
for two reasons. Where in the first instance the council in exercise of its powers under 
section 5(1) (a) determined that the applicant need not submit an assessment of socio-
economic considerations. Having made that decision, the council cannot purport to take 
into account a non-existent assessment of socio-economic considerations in making its 
                                                 
285
  Section 5(a) as set out in section 4 of the Bill. 
286
  As set out in section 4 of the Bill 
287




final decision. Having determined that the applicant need not submit an assessment of the 
socio-economic considerations in the first instance, any attempt to require the applicant to 
submit an assessment of the socio-economic considerations at the time of final decision 
making is not only contradictory but it amounts to an abuse of the procedure and hence, 
objectionable.  
 
Second, when making the final decision, the council may, apart from public input, 
consider EIA or socio-economic considerations, not both. Moreover, the elements of 
consistency and predictability are eroded by the existence of double standards. If socio-
economic considerations are regarded as relevant they ought to should be considered 
from the beginning to the end. By failing to make a clear and unambiguous provision 
safeguarding the role of socio-economic considerations in decision making, it is argued 
that the Bill is not, in any material way, responsive to the findings in the landmark case of 
BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation and Land Affairs.
288
 
In that case a dispute arose as to whether socio-economic considerations were relevant as 
a basis of refusing authorization to put up a filling station adjacent to other already 
existing stations. The court held that “the balancing of environmental interests with 
justifiable socio and economic development is to be conceptualized well beyond the 
present living generation”. The court observed further that section 24 of the constitution 





Although the Bill makes limited provisions relating to socio-economic considerations, the 
provision is a general one and does not specify the source and the areas likely to be 
affected most by the impact as envisaged by the Protocol. The Protocol is concerned with 
impacts arising from Modified Living Organisms (LMOs) and it puts emphasis on the 
value of biological diversity to the indigenous and local communities. The Bill neither 
makes reference to any these two aspects in its provisions on socio-economic 
considerations nor the environment. It merely states that before making a decision, the 
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Failure of the Bill to make consideration of socio-economic considerations mandatory, 
may adversely affect the livelihood and interests of the poor population which, many 
times, does not afford sufficient food and shelter. In these circumstances, it is tenable to 
maintain that the Bill is inadequate. In addition, the Bill contradicts the draft Biosafety 
policy 
291
published alongside the Bill. Section 3(30 of the draft policy states that “[t]he 
socio-economic and cultural factors,… must be taken into account” Apart from the 
likelihood of causing problems in implementation (due to inconsistency) if and when 
enacted, it leaves the question as to what and whose interests the resultant biosafety 
regime will serve, unanswered. Yet, considering that historically and even presently, the 
Act is serving the interests of the multinational companies and the biotechnology 
industry, it is acceptable to argue that the resultant legislation will, to a greater extent, 
still serve those same interests. Consequently to the extent that the Bill does not build a 
strong case for socio-economic considerations, it substantially retains the weak character 
of the parent act. 
 
3.3.7.3   A Comparative Analysis 
From the foregoing, it is discernable that the two countries have attempted, though 
differently, to implement Article 26 of the Protocol. The Kenyan Bill adopts an approach 
which goes beyond the scope of the Protocol by addressing GMOs as opposed to LMOs. 
Like the Protocol the Kenyan Bill identifies GMOs as the source of the potential impacts. 
However it does not place emphasis on biological diversity in the manner the Protocol 
does. Instead, the Kenyan Bill refers to the environment generally. On the other hand, the 
Kenyan Bill contains mandatory provisions that require the NBA to take socio-economic 
considerations into account in decision making. That as it may be successful application 
of the provision cannot be ascertained unless and until it stands judicial or other test of 
the time. 
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The GMO Amendment Bill of South Africa provides for taking into account of socio-
economic considerations though in a manner that leaves many loopholes which makes it 
possible for socio-economic considerations to be ignored or avoided altogether in the 
decision making process. By requiring the council to determine whether or not the 
applicant must submit an assessment of socio-economic considerations in addition to the 
application the provision renders consideration of socio-economic considerations 
discretionary. By making socio-economic consideration an alternative to EIA the Bill 
adopts ‘a plus and minus’ approach thereby lacking the much needed consistency and 
predictability in decision making. 
 
An interesting trend is obtainable from the approaches taken by both countries. Whereas 
the GMO Amendment Bill of South Africa contains weak provisions relating to socio-
economic considerations, the courts
292
 have, prior to drafting of the Bill, strongly 
supported their consideration as an integral part of sustainable development. In that sense 
the Judiciary in South Africa has played a critical role in the development of 
environmental law and protection of the environment against the potential impacts of 
GMOs. In the case of Kenya the provisions on socio-economic considerations in the 
Kenyan Bill appear workable but unless tested, their effectiveness may not be ascertained 
fully. Since the courts in South Africa have already set higher standards than those set by 
the Bill, it serves no meaningful purpose for the Bill to maintain its current weak 
position. Secondly the attempt to comply with the Protocol in relation to socio-economic 
considerations has failed to the extent that the Protocol does not provide socio-economic 
considerations as an alternative to EIA. Adoption of the Kenyan approach is an 
acceptable starting point. 
 
3.3.8 Monitoring  
Monitoring is the continuous assessment of information and comparing it to mandated 
parameters.
293
 It has been defined as the repeated measurement of three separate but 
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related factors: the quality of the environment and each of its compartments, activities or 
natural and anthropogenic inputs which may affect the quality of the environment and the 
effects of such activities.
294
 Monitoring is used by states to “observe, measure, evaluate 
and analyze, by recognized scientific methods the risks or effects of pollution or 
environmental harm”.
295
 Kiss and Shelton observe that monitoring provides constant 
feedback for decision making, from long-term protection to rapid guidance in emergency 
situations. They argue that to ensure progress the effectiveness of the monitoring must 
itself be monitored and assessed.
296
 In the absence of provisions or adequate provisions 
on monitoring, it would be difficult to determine levels of performance and how to 
improve the regime due to lack of feedback. Whereas Kenya has some provisions on 
monitoring, South Africa has none as seen below. 
 
3.3.8.1   Kenya 
Monitoring under the Bill is done by the regulatory agencies
297
 and through inspection.
298
 
Section 32(1) provides thus: “…the authority may require regulatory agencies... to carry 
out…monitoring, inspecting and evaluating activities” involving GMOs. Section 32(2) 
requires regulatory agencies to monitor an applicant’s activities but only where it is 
appropriate to do so. When so doing, the regulatory agency has two obligations: to ensure 
that the applicant’s activities comply with the requirements of the Act and any conditions 
imposed in connection with an approval under the Act. Two, to inform the NBA with 
immediate effect any new scientific information the agency becomes aware of that may 
pose potential biosafety risks not known previously. The agency shall also inform the 




On inspection, section 36 imposes an obligation on the inspector appointed under section 
34 to monitor compliance with the Act and the regulations thereto, and submit inspection 
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reports to the authority. Although the bill does not specify the intervals at which such 
reports shall be submitted, this may be specified in the regulations. 
 
The Protocol imposes two obligations for a party: to monitor the implementation of its 
obligations under the Protocol and to report to the conference of the parties serving as the 
meeting of the parties to the Protocol (COP / MOP) on measures it has taken to 
implement the Protocol. By requiring regulatory agencies to monitor the applicant’s 
activities and the inspector to monitor compliance with the Act and the regulations 
thereto, the Kenyan Bill is substantially consistent with the Protocol insofar as 
monitoring is concerned.  
 
Although the provisions on monitoring contained in the Bill substantially conform to the 
requirements of the Protocol, it must be noted that the Protocol imposes minimum 
standards and not the ceiling. Insofar as the NBA has supervisory powers that enable the 
NBA to require regulatory agencies to monitor, inspect and evaluate activities involving 
GMOs it is only meaningful that as far as possible, determined parameters be provided 
(especially in the regulations) against which monitoring can be tested. The Bill does not 
enumerate some of the areas that monitoring must cover. On the other hand, the Bill does 
not specify the intervals within which monitoring, inspection and reporting are done. The 
immediate reporting provided for under section 32(3) of the Kenyan Bill relates to 
situations where the regulatory agencies become aware of significant new scientific 
information relating to approved activities that may pose potential biosafety risks that 
were not known previously. Apart from that provision, regular and continuous reporting 
is not provided for thereby depriving the NBA the necessary feedback needed for 
decision making. Although the NBA may have records of all biotechnology and biosafety 
activities
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3.3.8.2   South Africa 
Neither the GMO Act nor the GMO Amendment Bill nor the regulations have any 
provisions on monitoring. The powers given to the inspectors pursuant to sections 15 and 
16 of the Act are basically policing in nature with a view of detecting breaches of the Act.  
No provision is made for the collection of data or keeping biosafety records. The ensuing 
situation places South Africa in a deplorable position in relation to information gathering 
and information exchange. 
 
3.3.8.3   A Comparative Analysis 
The biosafety Bill of Kenya has substantive provisions on monitoring and it imposes an 
obligation on regulatory agencies to monitor activities involving GMOs under their 
respective mandates.
301
 Pursuant to the provisions of section 7(g) the NBA is obligated to 
“keep a record of biotechnology and biosafety activities in Kenya”. These provisions are 
sufficiently compliant with the provisions of Article 33 of the Protocol.  
 
In the case of South Africa, no attempt has been made or at all to comply with the 
Protocol in the area of monitoring. Interestingly, under the GMO Amendment Bill, the 
registrar has powers to “communicate to the Biosafety Clearing House information 
specified in the regulations”. The current regulations are silent on monitoring yet a 
member state is required to report to the COP/MOP on “measures it has taken to 
implement the Protocol”. 
 
3.3.9 Conclusion 
Implementation of the Protocol in the two countries is taking two different dimensions. 
Whereas Kenya has drafted the biosafety Bill 2005, South Africa is in the process of 
amending the current GMO Act “so as to give effect to international agreements” 
pertaining to GMOs. The effect of these two approaches is that the Kenyan Bill makes 
provisions governing GMO Activities as a whole while the approach taken by South 
Africa is specifically intended to fill gaps in the GMO Act that otherwise make the Act 
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inconsistent with international agreements pertaining to GMOs. These approaches are 
likely to give different results if and when the two Bills are enacted into law. Whereas the 
GMO Amendment Act will not adequately fill the gaps in question, the Kenyan Bill has 
made admirable attempts to comply with the Protocol compared to South Africa in the 
context of the themes under focus in this study. 
 
The GMO Amendment Bill was drafted on an erroneous assumption that the current 
GMO Act is satisfactory save for the need to comply with the Protocol. The current GMO 
Act needs amendments not only for the purposes of complying with international 
agreements on biosafety but also because the legal regime established under the Act is 
glaringly inadequate and attempts to fill gaps cannot ‘salvage’ the Act. Attempts made to 
comply with the Protocol have also failed. The fact that the GMO Amendment Bill has 
no provisions relating to: objective, precautionary principle, public participation and 
monitoring as provided for by the Protocol or at all. Provisions (or lack of them) on risk 
assessment and risk management, is worrying. Currently, many of the inherent 
weaknesses of the GMO Act have been addressed mainly by NEMA to the extent that the 
GMO Act is like ‘a fly on the shoulders of NEMA’. We now turn to the summary, 






SUMMARY CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
4.1 Summary 
The competing paradigms involving Scientists, industry, powerful nations and 
multinational companies worldwide, coupled with ethical, political, cultural issues arising 
from modern biotechnology and public demands for transparency, and other factors, have 
made biosafety legislation a complex and sensitive issue globally. The ensuing cold war 
between the proponents and opponents of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), has 
made it difficult, if not impossible, for the international community to accept and develop 
a holistic biosafety regime. Adoption of the Cartagena Protocol (the Protocol) in year 
2000 was a result of a compromise reached between the two polarized camps in default 
of collapse of the negotiations prior to adoption of the Protocol. Efforts by Kenya and 
South Africa to comply with the provisions of the Protocol must grapple with the above 
imperatives and as a result, such efforts have not only (largely) failed but they are slow 
and have been and are being resisted. That being the case, developing holistic biosafety 
legislation that is relevant and workable in the two countries (and Africa as a whole) is at 




The fact that legal regulation of modern biotechnology is a complex and an emotive issue 
has made legal regulation of modern biotechnology in South Africa and Kenya an 
intricate process. The various competing socio-economic, cultural, political and other 
interests have made it invariably difficult for the two countries to establish holistic 
biosafety regimes. Attempts to establish and maintain a balance between environmental 
protection, risks to humans and avoiding over-regulation of modern biotechnology have 
become political questions that are not easy to reconcile. This is so because there are 
powerful forces and nations which have vested commercial and political interests in 





These advances are taking place in an era of globalization and market 
liberalization that promotes greater competition among nations and regions 
around the world. The ability of any one country to compete effectively in this 
emerging global market is largely dependent on its technological 
capabilities.As a result one cannot easily separate debates on the 
commercialization of biotechnology products from the larger competition 
among nations and among multinational corporations in the global market. 
Within this context, current debates about biotechnology’s impact on 
economic structures, human health and the environment co-exist within the 
broader framework of market liberalization and its implications for existing 
patterns of agricultural production in different parts of the world.
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This explains why modern biotechnology is part of a web of global concerns whose 
regulation cannot be divorced from the competing and quite often, irreconcilable interests 
that affect the content of biosafety legislation in many countries, Kenya and South Africa 
included. It is for this reason that attempts to develop biosafety legislation in the two 
countries must grapple with the forces which have a direct interest in the content and 
character of such legislation. Multinational companies such as Monsanto (supported by 
their governments and the host governments), are aggressively promoting GMOs in 
South Africa and Kenya and efforts to pass restrictive biosafety legislations are being 
resisted by such promoters. The close cooperation between scientists, industry and 
government in what is now termed as the “triple helix” which is responsible for the rapid 
adoption of transgenic crops, has resulted in loss of confidence
303
 in the ability of 
governments to pass biosafety laws that are more protective of the environment and 
human health. South Africa and Kenya are not exceptions.  
 
Caught up in this scenario, Kenya and South Africa have adopted different approaches to 
biosafety regulation. Kenya drafted the Biosafety Bill 2003 which never saw the light of 
the day. It has since been replaced by the Biosafety Bill 2005. South Africa has the GMO 
Act which became operational on 1
st
 December 1999. The GMO Amendment Bill 2005 is 
primarily intended to make the GMO Act compliant with international agreements, the 
Protocol being one such a global treaty. This is to be achieved by filling the gaps in the 
GMO Act.  
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This study set out to compare implementation of the Protocol in Kenya and South Africa. 
The Kenyan biosafety regime was examined in the context of the biosafety Bill 2005 and 
the biosafety regime of South Africa in the context of the GMO Act and the GMO 
Amendment Bill 2005. The main goal of the study was to establish the extent to which 
current and proposed biosafety legislation in South Africa and proposed biosafety 
legislation in Kenya are consistent with or at variance with the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety. In order to achieve the main goal three specific objectives were addressed: an 
overview of international and regional approaches to biosafety regulation was examined 
with a view of placing biosafety regulation in its appropriate context; a thematic 
comparison of some of the salient features of the Protocol was done. A litmus test was 
provided by way of an assessment to determine the extent to which the resultant 
legislation may be relevant and workable domestically. The study was guided by the 
conceptual framework contained in figure 1. 
 
The findings of this thesis are threefold: First, the Protocol is a compromise treaty that 
lays minimum biosafety requirements limited to LMOs and hence its regime is narrow 
and its key provisions inadequate. Member states are not eager (whether willingly or not) 
to adopt more stringent provisions in their domestic legislation apart from failure to 
comply with the Protocol. 
 
Second variance outweighs consistency in attempts by Kenya and South Africa to comply 
with the Protocol. However, it is evident that the Kenyan Bill is, to some extent, on the 
right road map towards a holistic approach (though it has a long way to go) than the 
GMO Act together with the GMO Amendment Bill 2005. In the areas where the two 
countries are at variance with the Protocol none of the relevant provisions in the two 
countries appear similar.  
 
Third to the extent that the GMO Act (together with the GMO Amendment Bill 2005) 
does not provide for the precautionary principle, and is glaringly inadequate in its 
provisions on the themes under study, it miserably fails the litmus test of being relevant 




right direction but, even if enacted, effective implementation plays critical roles if the 
enacted legislation is to pass the litmus test. As Bell and McGillivray authoritatively 




The study noted an interesting trend that is emerging in attempts to comply with the 
Protocol. The regimes being established in both jurisdictions are elusive on aspects that 
were critical and contentious during the negotiations prior to adoption of the Protocol. 
These include issues of risk assessment, risk management, public participation and access 
to information. Whether by coincidence or not, these are some of the key issues at the 
centre of biosafety that the public is most concerned about. Moreover biosafety is all 
about avoiding, controlling and minimizing of risks associated with modern 
biotechnology.  
 
In essence, although modern biotechnology is an invention of man, it gives rise to a 
complex web of socio-economic, cultural, ethical, political and other issues that man is 
unable to resolve. 
 
4.2 Recommendations 
The following recommendations are relevant and useful in two important ways: 
Improving the quality and character of the resultant legislations; and, can be replicated in 
jurisdictions with similar predicament and weaknesses in their existing or intended 
biosafety regimes.  
 
4.2.1 Kenya 
(i) The objective contained in section 4(a) of the Bill needs to encompass two 
important elements: conservation of biological diversity, human health and 
pharmaceuticals for human use on one hand, and identification and labeling 
on the other hand. 
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(ii) The scope in terms of section 3(1) of the Kenyan Bill should specifically be 
stated in clear and unambiguous terms.  
(iii) Public participation in Kenya may be enhanced by holding at least one public 
‘baraza’ (public meeting) at the intended scene. Formal announcements 
through the electronic media will also be useful. The anticipated regulations 
should provide for further mechanisms of enhancing public participation. 
(iv) On risk assessment Provision should be made for scrutiny or verification of 
the risk assessment report by an independent assessor in the event that the 
application is rejected before an appeal is preferred. This is appropriate in the 
interest of justice especially since the NBA is the one that carries out risk 
assessment and also makes the decision. Risk assessment should also include 
effects to human health. Specific provision should be made to ensure that each 
GMO undergoes an appropriate period of observation that is commensurate to 
its life-circle before it is put into its intended use.  
(v) On risk management, the NBA should have more control over the regulatory 
agencies that are obligated to manage and control risks. It is not enough to 
liaise with the regulatory agencies as liaising alone cannot avail the results 
envisaged by Article 16 of the Protocol. 
(vi) The Kenyan Bill should specify: the intervals within which monitoring must 
be done and the areas to be covered as opposed to making general provisions 
unless the anticipated regulations comprehensively do so. 
(vii) On risk assessment it is recommended that provisions be made for scrutiny or 
verification of the risk assessment report by an independent assessor in the 
event that the application is rejected before an appeal is preferred. This is 
appropriate in the interest of justice especially since the NBA is the one that 
carries out risk assessment and makes the decision. Risk assessment should 




4.2.2 South Africa 
(i) Stated objective(s) embracing the precautionary principle, transparency and 
predictability in the decision making process should be included in the GMO 
Amendment Bill as a matter of urgency.
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(ii) The scope should encompass the aspects covered by the Protocol and also 
include pharmaceutical for human use. 
(iii) A strong Council with a defined legal status needs to be established and the 
excess powers of the registrar reduced as the Council is the statutory body that 
is accountable to the public. 
(iv) The AIA procedure should be spelt out clearly. Its provisions including the 
time frames should be adjusted and be included in the substantive provisions 
of the law rather than leaving such power to the discretion of the Council and 
the minister in the regulations.  
(v) The words “public input” need a definition. Elaborate provisions relating to 
public participation need to be provided for. The law should state clearly the 
role of the public in decision making and the responsibilities of the Council in 
relation to public participation. Publication of the notices should be extended 
to include formal announcements in the electronic media. Provision should 
also be made for one public meeting at the scene of the intended GMO 
activity.  
(vi) Risk assessment should be mandatory (with a few exceptions) in the decision 
making process. Substantive and clear provisions should be put in place in the 
GMO Amendment Bill to ensure that risk assessment is done in a transparent 
manner.  
(vii) Clear and unambiguous provisions are needed in the GMO Amendment Bill 
making consideration of socio-economic factors mandatory in view of the 
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(viii) Provisions as to monitoring are needed in the GMO Amendment Bill in 
compliance with the Protocol and also to enhance the quality of the resultant 
legislation. 
 
4.2.3 Kenya and South Africa 
Comprehensive biosafety policies and regulations should be put in place in both countries 
as part of the biosafety framework. The content of the policies and regulations will reveal 
the values being protected. To ensure biosafety we need to develop science policies that 




4.2.4 Further Studies 
Legal regulation of modern biotechnology presents many challenges for scholars. The 
issues to be covered are as wide as they are varied. A few aspects may be pointed out. 
Similar comparisons need to be carried out between and among other jurisdictions in 
Africa; the themes discussed in this study can be investigated further as separate studies; 
the unresolved issues of the Protocol especially liability and redress, identification and 
labeling need to be addressed; and the issues relating to the Protocol and WTO are also 
critical. 
 
                                                 
307
  Third World Network, (Biosafety Information Centre) “Key Regulatory Issues”, July 21, 2006, 










Republic of Kenya: The Constitution Adopted in 1963 Amended in 1999 
Environmental Management Co-ordination Act 8 of 1999 
 
Bills 
Republic of Kenya: Biosafety Bill 2005 
Republic of Kenya: Biosafety Bill 2003 
 
South Africa 
Republic of South Africa: The Constitution Act 108 of 1996. 
Biological Diversity Act 10 of 2004 
Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998. 
Foods, cosmetics and disinfectants Act 54 of 1971. 
Genetically Modified Organisms Act 15 of 1997 
Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
 
Bills 
Republic of South Africa: Genetically Modified Organisms Amendment Bill 2005 
 
Regulations 
Department  of Agriculture: Genetically Modified Organisms Act  15 of 1997 
Regulations, 26
th
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